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Background: The implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in low to 
middle income (LMICs) has been followed by a marked reduction in their progress on 
economic growth, social indicators and health outcomes. Comprehensive and contextualized 
explorations of the effects of SAPs are needed to assist health and social policy-makers in 
better determining responses to such programs that continue to dominate global trade, aid 
and debt cancellation negotiations. 
 
Methods: A comparative case study of Argentina and Uruguay was developed exploring the 
effects of SAPs on health. Drawing from a population health perspective and using a 
framework developed to analyze the relationship between globalization and health, changes 
in domestic policies resulting from SAPs and the corresponding population health outcomes 
of the countries were explored.  
 
Results:  In general, SAPs were implemented with greater severity and speed in Argentina 
than in Uruguay, with the greatest differences occurring over the 1980s. The more gradual 
and modest reforms implemented in Uruguay over the 1980s were associated with better 
population health outcomes. As Uruguay’s reforms began to accelerate and more closely 
resemble Argentina’s over the 1990s, differences in population health of the countries were 
diminished. 
 
Conclusions: Findings support those of previous studies demonstrating that countries that 
have maintained more protectionist policies have been better able to protect the health of 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background 
 
Globalization has led to a number of important population health-related economic 
policies (1-3). While globalization may not be a new phenomenon, the pace, intensity, and 
scale of its impact across all societies has substantially accelerated(2). Contemporary 
globalization is distinguished by the establishment of binding agreements through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the emergence of economically powerful trans-national 
companies, and the growing acceptance by countries of a neoliberal agenda marked by 
increased market liberalization and reduced interference by the state. A central mechanism 
through which globalization has been spread is the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) in low to middle income countries (LMICs)1.   
SAPs were a set of economic and public policy conditions imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) on indebted LMICs (2,4-6). They 
were intended to ensure macroeconomic stability, control runaway inflation and permit 
governments to maintain interest payments on national loans owed to banks and 
development agencies in high income countries (HIC). While there is still much 
disagreement around the impact of SAPs on health, there is growing evidence that LMICs 
have suffered a decline in economic growth, health and social progress since their 
introduction (2,4,7-10). In particular, SAPs have been critiqued for their role in exacerbating 
poverty and inequality while accelerating environmental degradation (1,11-13).  
                                                 
1
 This document uses the World Bank categories to denote country differences. Countries 
are organized according to per capita gross national income (GNI) levels calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas Method. The groups are: low income (LIC); lower middle income 
(LMC); upper middle income (UMC); and high income (HIC). See: The World Bank 
Group. Data & Statistics: Country Classification. 2007 [cited 2007 17 August]; 
Document on internet] Available from: http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0.   
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SAPs weak growth performance and, in some cases, propensity to worsen the living 
conditions of the poor over the 1980s and 1990s led to the recognition that alternative 
policies were needed(7,14-16). To this end, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were 
introduced in 1999, with innovative elements such as participation of civil society and a 
focus on governance and alternative social policies (14). Disappointingly, however, despite 
this commitment to a new approach, the macroeconomic policies adopted by the majority of 
the PRSP countries have basically resulted in a continuation of SAPs (7). As PRSPs are 
required before countries can receive debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPIC) initiative, and, increasingly, for bilateral development assistance or concessional 
loans from the World Bank, they continue to significantly propagate the economic 
neoliberalism underlying SAPs (1,15). So while SAPs no longer exist in name, their successor 
continues to embody most of SAPs’ economic framework. 
This neoliberal economic framework extends beyond the boundaries of agreements 
signed under SAPs and PRSPs. SAPs embody many of the economic policies of 
contemporary globalization, which have repercussions for Canada and the world (4,6,17-19). 
Liberalization, for example, while one of SAPs’ conditions, is now binding on most of the 
world’s countries through the agreements of the WTO (20). With increasing economic 
interdependence has come a reduction in the authority of national governments over their 
social and environmental regulatory space (4,17,19,21).  As with LMIC’s involvement with 
SAPs, Canada’s participation in agreements such as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, 
NAFTA, and the WTO’s agreements raises concerns that governments will no longer be 
able to enact or maintain policies that protect the health and equity of their citizens (17). A 
retrospective look at the twenty years experience of increased liberalization, privatization and 
market integration policies of the SAPs that were imposed on LMICs gives insight into the 
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potential health implications of trade agreements that most high, middle and low income 
countries have been and are continuing to voluntarily enter into (17). Thus, an examination 
of SAPs effects on health holds important lessons for current and future global population 
health. 
Latin America was a key region of the world in which SAPs were imposed, and 
serious political, economic and social problems have emerged (10,16,22). Since the mid-
1980s, the neoliberal economic and political ideas on which SAPs were based have become 
the norm throughout Latin America2 (4,5). This transition has been accompanied by growing 
political, social and economic critiques. Political power, for instance, has been restructured 
to allow the agenda of business and financial agents to take precedence over labour and 
other societal interests causing concern about its effects on issues such as poverty, 
environmental degradation and income inequality. Along with social problems, neoliberal 
reforms have generated disappointing economic results in Latin America in terms of growth 
and stability, as demonstrated by the debilitating hyperinflation of the early 1990s (23). 
Politically neoliberal reforms have also promulgated the installation of neopopulist, quasi-
authoritarian governments (such as the Menem government in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru 
and Caldera in Venezuela) leading to public outcries demanding attention to issues of 
accountability and transparency, judicial reform, corruption, and human rights. The 
emergence of serious social problems and the persistence of economic and political 
problems have prompted a significant questioning of SAPs’ neoliberal orientation and 
provoked a need for more research into the ways in which it can be altered to address these 
shortcomings.   
                                                 
2
 A notable exception is Cuba 
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While SAPs followed a neoliberal paradigm, the degree to which these reforms were 
adopted varied across countries. Factors such as popular resistance, policy preference of 
national decision-makers, and the perceived need to implement macroeconomic policies that 
would attract foreign investment affected the extent to which countries’ policy reforms 
reflected the neoliberal prescriptions found in SAPs (1,15,24). These differences in policies 
adopted in countries during the implementation of SAPs offer a unique opportunity to 
retrospectively explore if and how these variations differentially affected their health. As will 
be discussed in the fourth chapter Argentina and Uruguay in particular provide ideal country 
cases as they embody sufficient contextual similarities and differences in their 
implementation of SAPs to allow for a meaningful contrast of the effects of these policies on 
their economic, social and health outcomes. Such a comparison can assist health policy-
makers to better formulate responses to the neoliberal economic framework which informed 
SAPs and PRSPs and which continue to dominate global trade, aid and debt cancellation 
negotiations. Given the importance of future research that provides contextualized 
examinations of the impact of neoliberal policies on health, the overarching research 
question guiding the study was: How did differences in the implementation of SAPs and the 
attendant domestic policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s differentially affect the population 
health of Argentina and Uruguay?  
1.1 Study Approach  
This study examines the effects of SAPs on Argentina and Uruguay from a 
population health perspective through the use of an analytical framework that links global 
policies to local health outcomes. The following section provides an overview of the 
concepts of population health and explores the dimensions and levels of the analytical 
framework.  
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1.1.1 A Population Health Approach 
 Population health is a perspective that encompasses the consideration of interrelated 
conditions and factors that influence the health of populations over the life course, identifies 
systematic variations in their patterns of occurrence, and applies the resulting knowledge to 
develop and implement policies and actions to improve the health and well-being of 
populations (25). Population health is focused not only on observing what are the patterns, 
conditions and factors associated with health but also questions how these patterns came to 
be, what are the mechanisms producing these patterns, and why they exist (26,27). 
Population health is a proactive rather than reactive approach to health that seeks to create 
positive environments that promote health by addressing the distal sources or underlying 
health producing contexts rather than intervening only after health problems have arisen 
(28).  
 As a field, population health is interdisciplinary and intersectoral in its approach, 
spanning traditional academic disciplinary boundaries, communities and sectors within 
society (25). Accordingly, it takes a broad multidimensional perspective to its understanding 
of health that acknowledges the importance of a wide spectrum of social, economic, 
political, environmental and structural determinants of health operating at the macro and 
micro level of the population (26,29,30). From a population health perspective, the factors 
that determine health go beyond the dominant modern medical paradigm that views health 
primarily as a consequence of biological or lifestyle factors and places responsibility for 
health on the health care system and individual lifestyle choices (31). Rather, health is seen as 
determined by a complex array of interconnected social, economic and political determinants 
that require intersectoral responses at individual, community, domestic and macroeconomic 
levels (25,26,29,32). Thus population health recognises a diverse range of social, political, 
 6
and economic determinants of health; considers their interaction with the global and local 
historical contexts in which they occur; and sees health as an outcome influenced and 
measured by this complex relationship.  
1.1.2 A Population Health Perspective of SAPs 
SAPs, and more broadly neoliberalism, are touted to have many positive effects on 
health through their purported stimulation of economic growth and poverty alleviation(30). 
Despite these claims, growing evidence demonstrates that neoliberalism has substantially 
hindered economic growth and that even when growth has occurred the benefits have been 
highly skewed in favour of the wealthy (33,34). A key problem underlying this discrepancy 
arises from the manner in which SAPs have been evaluated. Advocates of SAPs have often 
limited their analysis of their impacts on health to a simplistic growth = health equation 
(30,35,36). Ignored in this narrow emphasis on aggregate measures of wealth is the 
recognition that health is a product of a broad spectrum of health determinants. Income 
inequality, the erosion of public health systems and social protection, for instance, have all 
been shown to have important connections to health and have also all suffered under the 
imposition of neoliberal policies (32). An examination of SAPs from a population health 
perspective, in contrast, requires focusing on a wide spectrum of economic and social health 
determinants. 
1.2 A Framework for Globalization and Health 
Accompanying the growing need to examine SAPs from a population health 
perspective has been the increasing awareness of the inadequacy of models that can be used 
to trace its effects on health (1,37,38). Quite often, political economists ignore micro level 
analysis while social and health academics are criticized for failing to address the underlying 
macro causes of health problems (39). This tension has led to a search for research 
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frameworks that can better understand and explain the effects of macroeconomic policies on 
the population health within countries(38). Practical models that encompass a broad range of 
health determinants and identify the specific pathways through which macro-level economic 
policies affect micro-level health outcomes are needed if policy makers are to be able to 
better address the growing health concerns surrounding these economic policies (1,37,38).  
This study sought to explore the effects of the macroeconomic policy interventions 
of SAPs on the population health of Argentina and Uruguay by adopting a framework that 
traces the connections between globalization and health(37) (See figure 1). The framework 
begins with three cascading categories (spanning super-ordinate to domestic contexts) that 
help depict how globalization is linked to the national policies of countries. At a super-
ordinate level the categories pre-existing endowments captures the historical context of the 
country (e.g. political, social, and economic traditions) as well as their accumulation of pre-
existing endowments (e.g. economic development level, human capital development). These 
endowments were present prior to the imposition of contemporary globalization and thus 
shape how globalization manifests itself and consequently affects health outcomes. At the 
global level, macroeconomic policies, represent the primary vehicles through which 
contemporary globalization is disseminated. This category encompasses policies such as 
SAPs (the focus of this study) and their replacement PRSPs, enforceable trade agreements, 
official development assistance and the multiple agreements on human rights such as 
environmental protection, and women and children’s rights. The effect of macroeconomic 
policies on health were than traced to their impact on domestic policies which in this study 
were represented by economic (trade, privatization), social (labour market, pensions) and 
health (health care systems) sectors. Changes and restrictions to national government’s 
ability to make autonomous decisions as a result of bi-directional conditionalities from loan, 
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aid, debt forgiveness or trade agreement commitments push policy directions in countries 
toward a neoliberal model.    
Next the framework narrows its focus to a detailed exploration of the effects of 
domestic reforms on their corresponding outcomes in each sector. The effects of reforms 
range from the national to the local level depending on the sector examined. Trade reforms 
are linked to their effects on trade balance, export and import growth; privatization reforms 
to consumer costs and service delivery, political effects, and long and short-term economic 
effects; labour market reforms to per capita income, real wages, unemployment, precarious 
employment, and underemployment; pensions to fiscal costs, administrative costs, domestic 
savings, compliance, coverage, inequities and gender; and health care system reforms to 
coverage, inequities, and cost containment. This sample of effects provides a snapshot of the 
complex and interconnected pathways by which domestic policy reforms affect the 
economic, social, and health conditions of countries.    
Finally the framework broadens its focus to an examination of the cumulative 
population health effects of reforms represented by the circular figure on the left side of the 
diagram. The outer ring of the circle represents the economic (GDP, inflation, debt) and 
social (inequality, poverty) population health determinants and the inside circle the health 
outcomes (infant mortality and under five mortality) of the countries. The economic and 
social determinants of health and the corresponding health outcomes provide an overall 
picture of the population health of the country.  Population health is thus the result of bi-
directional interactions of multiple processes and forces from the global to household level.  
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This analytical framework is used to guide the exploration of the effects of SAPs on 
the population health of Argentina and Uruguay. The following Chapter examines the 
historical development of neoliberalism and SAPs and explores the relationship between 
SAPs’ economic reforms and health. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodological 
approach and incorporation of the analytical framework used to guide this study. Chapter 4 
presents an analysis of the reforms to domestic policies and their effects on the 
corresponding sector through an analysis of a comprehensive body of literature and selected 
data sources. Chapter 5 explores the cumulative population health effects of these reforms 
through an examination of economic and social determinants of health and their 
corresponding effects on health outcomes. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a discussion 
of the results, their significance for the future study of neoliberal economic globalization, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2  SAPs, The Rise of Neoliberalism, &  
The Ongoing Health Debate 
 
 This chapter describes and analyses important contextual aspects leading to the 
implementation of SAPs and discusses the relationship between key structural adjustment 
reforms and health. The reforms examined represent a diverse sample of economic, social, 
and health policy areas including: trade, privatisation, labour market, pensions and health 
systems. By exploring a diverse body of literature SAPs is situated in the context of the 
historical development of neoliberalism and the health arguments for and against the 
neoliberal reforms advocated for under SAPs are examined.   
2.1 Paving the way for Neoliberalism through and with SAPs 
While differences in the implementation of SAPs may allow the countries’ reforms to 
be compared, it is difficult to differentiate between neoliberal reforms implemented due to 
SAPs and those voluntarily taken on by national governments (16,34,37). This difficulty is in 
some regards a negligible issue, as SAPs were implemented with the intention of entrenching 
a neoliberal perspective on the economic policy of the countries in which they were 
imposed. ‘Voluntary’ adoptions of such policies can thereby be seen as a by- product of the 
successful diffusion of SAPs market-oriented principles. So, while the motivations for 
adopting neoliberal reforms can’t be easily distinguished, the imposition of SAPs can be 
considered the central force driving LMICs’ transitions from protectionist to neoliberalist 
economic and political models (22,40). The following is an examination of SAPs’ 
foundations in, and utilization as a vehicle for the dissemination of, neoliberal policies in 
LMICs.  
 Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-
being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an 
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institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, 
unencumbered markets, and free trade (34). The role of the state in this model is to create 
and preserve an institutional framework supportive to such practices. SAPs advanced this 
perspective by advocating for multiple domestic policies aimed at integrating national 
economies into the global marketplace and reducing the interference of the state (4,41). 
These market-oriented domestic policies included fiscal austerity, trade liberalization and 
currency devaluation, retrenchment and deregulation, and the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (4). 
 SAPs were not only based on a neoliberal paradigm but were imposed with the 
intention of entrenching neoliberal policies in LMICs. One reason for this push was the 
perceived threat to the political and economic interests of capitalist elites in the 1970s (34). 
Prior to that time and since the Second World War, import substitution industrialization 
(ISI)3 had been the dominant development approach prevailing in LMICs (4,40,42-46). ISI 
threatened the economic supremacy of capitalist elites because it restrained the economic 
power of the upper classes and accorded labour a much larger share in the division of wealth 
(34). With the world recession of the early 1970s, this economic squeeze became more 
apparent and ruling classes were further threatened by a resurgence of communist and 
socialist powers responding to the economic problems of the time (34). 
                                                 
3 ISI policies were an economic development approach that encouraged the local production 
of previously imported manufactured goods. A major impetus toward Latin American 
countries adopting ISI was the Great Depression of the 1930s when commodity prices fell 
and world demand dropped off. Economic development could not be guaranteed through 
exporting primary commodities so a form of industrialization was necessary. This strategy 
relied heavily on the intervention by the state to control trade and investment through 
protective measures such as tariffs and quotas as well as involving corporatist labour 
relations with the trade unions who supported these national projects.  
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As capitalists felt increasingly vulnerable, they sought an economic approach that 
was more in line with their interests. It was found in the teachings of a group of economists 
called the “Chicago boys” who espoused the neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman (34). 
Friedman revitalized liberal economic teachings4 that had dominated US economic policies 
from the late 1700s to the time they were discredited during the Great Depression. Milton’s 
neoliberalist theories maintained much of liberalism’s market-oriented stance but modified 
small aspects which he saw as having led to the economic problems of the Great 
Depression5 (47). In order to give credibility to these newly restored theories Chile was used 
as an experimental location in which to demonstrate their effectiveness. A coup d’etat in 
Chile in 1973, strongly backed by the CIA and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was 
initiated to replace the socialist president Salvador Allende with neoliberal dictator Augusto 
Pinochet. Chile’s subsequent economic growth, which ironically was accompanied by an 
unacknowledged increase in inequality and poverty, provided the justification for the 
neoliberal policies later adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Britain (under Thatcher) 
and the United States (under Reagan) (47,48). The debt crisis following the collapse of the 
second oil boom in 1981 then provided an opportune moment in which to further spread 
neoliberal economic policies in LMICs.  
While the 1970s set the stage for a neoliberal revolution, a debt crisis in resource-
based economies, especially in Latin America, initiated a radical sequence of events that 
                                                 
4 Liberal economic thought was developed by a Scottish economist Adam Smith in the late 
1700s.  
5 Milton modified the old quantity theory of money and replaced it with monetarist theory. 
Monetarist theory sought to change what was seen as the overly restrictive policies of the 
Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Central Bank. Milton thought that the previous 
overproduction crises and periods of inflation and deflation of the Great Depression were 
caused by fluctuations in the money supply and could be avoided if the Federal Reserve were 
required to increase the money supply at the same rate as the estimated growth of real 
economic output.  
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demolished protectionist policies and implemented neoliberal economic approaches in these 
indebted countries (4,42). The debt crisis was unanticipated and threatened the collapse of 
confidence in one or more of the major US banks(49). The US Treasury, the Federal Reserve 
Board and the IMF took political control of the crisis and pressured small banks to maintain 
additional loans to indebted countries despite their desire to withdraw. Despite other 
significant external factors (e.g. oil crisis, rising interest rates) protectionist policies were 
blamed for the economic crisis, and the IMF and the World Bank were brought in to 
reorganize debtor economies based on the neoliberal paradigm (4,49).  
New loans and the rescheduling of old loans were made dependent on conditionality 
agreements that imposed a neoliberal agenda. Those countries that challenged the legitimacy 
of complying with the debt repayment plans were intimidated into complying with threats of 
economic reprisal (4,49). In a speech to the US Chamber of commerce in 1983, the US 
Treasurer, Robert McNamara outlined the sanctions available against a defaulter. McNamara 
stated that “the foreign assets of a country would be attacked by creditors throughout the 
world: its exports would be seized by creditors at each dock where they landed, its national 
airlines unable to operate and its sources of desperately needed capital goods and spare parts 
virtually eliminated” and that “in many countries even food imports would be curtailed” (4). 
Failure to get an IMF loan due to rejection of a SAP package would have also been taken as 
a sign of fiscal instability, leading to international bond raters giving the country a very poor 
rating and consequently raising the interest cost substantially for countries wishing to borrow 
from private international creditors(50,51). In this way, the debt crisis and subsequent 
enforcement of SAP conditionalities facilitated both the transition to and entrenchment of 
neoliberalism as the dominant economic approach in LMICs.   
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2.2 Neoliberal Reforms and Health 
Accompanying the growth of neoliberalism as the hegemonic economic approach in 
LMICs has been the increasing awareness of the inability of many countries to protect and 
promote health(52). In this study the health effects of a broad range of economic (i.e. trade, 
privatization), social (i.e. labour market, pension) and health (i.e. healthcare systems) policy 
reforms are explored. This exploration does not represent an exhaustive list of neoliberal 
reforms adopted in Argentina and Uruguay under SAPs; but rather provides a representative 
sample of the differences in intensity and comprehensiveness of the reforms undertaken in 
the countries. More importantly, the reform areas examined encompass key examples of 
both distal6 (economic, social) and proximate7 health determinants (health care systems) (See 
table 2.1) (53). The following section provides a discussion of the policy reforms examined 
in this study and their importance as health determinants.  









 Labour Market  
 Pensions 
 
                                                 
6 Distal determinants are health determinants at the most distant point from the health 
outcome in the chain of causality.  
7 Proximate determinants are health determinants at the closest point to the health outcome 
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2.2.1 Trade Reform and Health: Perpetuating Poverty 
The relationship between trade and health is a widely debated topic with proponents 
and critics both mustering evidence for their claims (1,17,54). From the dominant neoliberal 
perspective, integration into the world economy through trade is thought to promote 
economic growth thereby reducing poverty and consequently improving health (55). SAPs 
generally include reforms pushing trade liberalization, which involves the reduction of 
barriers, such as tariffs, import quotas and restrictions on foreign investment, in order to 
allow for the free flow of goods and services.  
The proposed economic advantages of trade liberalization lay in its ability to drive 
down the costs of inputs for exportable manufactured products, thus increasing exports and 
easing the scarcity of foreign exchange (41). In addition, trade liberalization is argued to 
increase productivity by exposing previously protected industries to competition. In the 
context of rapidly rising prices, trade liberalization is intended to curb inflation by increasing 
competition from imports, preventing price increases due to monopolization. These 
conditions should theoretically enhance the ‘natural’ comparative advantage of the economy 
in which a country increases growth and efficiency by specializing in the production of 
goods that it is able to produce at a lower cost than a competitor.  
Critics of this theory argue that economic growth is not a predictable consequence of 
increased openness to trade and highlight the flaws of the argument that economic growth 
automatically leads to poverty reduction and health, particularly in the absence of 
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redistributive mechanisms (56). In reality, the effects of trade liberalization cannot be 
oversimplified as either positive or negative. A closer look reveals that trade liberalization 
may aid producers already involved in the cash economy, while subsistence farmers, for 
example, benefit little and may even be harmed by increased trade (1,56). Some trade also 
has clearly negative ecological consequences that undermine its economic benefits. Irrigation 
of land and toxic fertilizer and pesticide runoff, for example, may increase agricultural 
production but can also compromise access to potable water (56).  
While the effects of trade liberalization on health are unpredictable, much evidence 
points to disproportionate losses amongst many LMICs, and particularly for the poor within 
them (1,55). International trade has been accompanied by the rise of dominant nation-states 
that use their power to influence the terms of trade (i.e. trade agreements) in their favour. 
Unfair trade rules, for instance, encourage the reduction of trade barriers in developing 
nations while maintaining protection in developed countries (e.g. agricultural subsides in 
industrialized nations) (1,55). When LMICs seek access to northern markets, they face trade 
barriers that, on average, are four times higher than those applied when HIC income 
countries trade with each other (57). Trade restrictions are also concentrated in the areas in 
which the poor stand to benefit, such as textiles, garments and agriculture. International 
trade rules further retain high tariffs for value added products and low barriers to primary 
products, locking LMICs into the exportation of low value-added goods that produce limited 
technology transfer and have negligible links to the local economy (1,57). In addition, trade 
liberalization has been found to encourage large-scale, often foreign-owned and operated 
firms that have undermined small domestic businesses and industries, leading to increasing 
inequalities(18). Chen and Berlinguer write that the wealth arising from increased global 
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trade is becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of a “transnational elite” who 
are “becoming less responsive or obligated to the socially underprivileged” (30).  
A number of other indirect connections between trade and health exist. The rise of 
food exports from LMICs has also lead to food security issues that especially affect the poor 
(56). Additionally, questions of the gendered affects of trade liberalization have also arisen. 
Women, for instance, are thought to be particularly affected by trade liberalization as the 
decline in domestic food availability increases women’s labour time in household food 
production. Trade liberalization therefore, is a complex and unpredictable policy measure 
that has the potential to result in economic gains for some; but these gains may be at the 
expense of many LMIC populations, the environment, women and the poor. 
2.2.2 Privatization and Health: Profit vs Equity and Public Welfare 
The relationship between privatization and health determinants is similarly complex 
and disputed. Privatization means that services, utilities or other companies owned and 
maintained by the public (through the government) are made available for purchase to 
private bidders(58). Advocates of privatization argue its health benefits based on purported 
economic improvements (59). The privatization of public goods in Latin America began in 
the 1970s in Chile and in the 1990s spread through most of the region, often as part of 
SAPs’ conditionalities . The privatization of a public monopoly (electricity, for example) 
opened the market to multiple companies, created competition and supposedly contributed 
to greater efficiency within the market (60). In addition to increased efficiency, privatization 
was also intended to raise money for governments that were desperately in need of it and to 
reduce the fiscal burden of public enterprises (thus enabling them to meet their foreign debt 
repayments)(58). Privatization, from this perspective, improved the economic profitability of 
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industries, the quality and cost of services for consumers and helped maintain foreign debt 
payments (60). 
Critics of this view counter that in reality privatization eroded health because it 
placed unwarranted trust in the market’s ability to equitably allocate resources(35). While 
theoretically privatization intended to improve competition (and as a result to improve the 
affordability and quality of services), opponents argue that in actuality it encouraged the 
domination of markets and undermined the efficiency it was intended to promote(61,62). 
Teeple writes that the idea of free markets that encourage competition is an illusion masking 
“cartelization8, monopolization, and oligopolization9” (19,61,62). As privatization increased, 
critics feared that public well-being would be sacrificed at the expense of corporate profits. 
The increasing privatization of water, for example, led to the control of 70 percent of water 
service in the world by two companies whose profits exceeded more than most of the 
national economies in which they operated (63). These profits were accompanied by rate 
hikes, cut offs to customers who couldn’t pay and reduced water quality. The poor were 
further claimed to have suffered under privatization as government driven equity enhancing 
policies, such as cross-subsidization10 of public utilities (e.g. water, sanitation, electricity), 
were eliminated (35,64). The shift to a market ideology was thus argued to jeopardize 
population health by eroding societies’ collective sense of responsibility for public welfare 
and replacing it with a naive faith in an unregulated private sector (65,66). 
                                                 
8 Cartelization is the uniting of large numbers of sellers to reduce competition and raise 
prices.  
9 Oligopolization is corporate consolidation (mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, and buyouts) 
that leads to reduced competition, surplus profits and price collusion. 
10 Cross-subsidization can take two forms: lower costs for less affluent consumers or 
domestic customers compensated by higher costs to more affluent or industrial consumers; 
or the use of profits from one state-owned sector (e.g. telecommunications) to subsidize the 
costs of another state-owned sector (e.g. health care or water).  
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2.2.3 Labour Market Policies 
The labour market has been recognized as one of the main links between the 
economy and health, as it has an impact on employment, wages, working conditions, income 
distribution and poverty(67). Employment conditions have a significant effect on a person’s 
physical, mental and social health(68). Paid work provides not only money, but social 
contacts, opportunities for personal growth and a sense of identity and purpose. Higher 
incomes are associated with a greater degree of control over one’s life and especially over 
stressful situations, which has a strong positive influence on health. Losing employment and 
income can have serious consequences for an individual, such as a reduced life expectancy 
and significantly greater health problems, than those who have work. Individual 
unemployment and high societal levels of unemployment not only affect those without 
work, but have wider impacts on their families and their communities. Women in particular, 
suffer from unique stresses during periods of high unemployment or reduced income as they 
frequently compensate by seeking work outside the home while simultaneously maintaining 
their work in the home.  
While it is generally acknowledged that conditions of the labour market play a 
significant role in determining health, the health effects of neoliberal versus protectionist 
approaches to labour policy are strongly disputed (69,70). At the start of the 1980s, in the 
context of the debt crisis, adopting market driven labour policies that promoted flexible 
employment conditions came to be considered a necessary condition for increasing 
productivity and allowing businesses to compete in a changing global market (69-71). The 
proposed health benefits of labour market reform resided largely in its supposed economic 
advantages in promoting the external competitiveness of industries, contributing to 
maintaining price stability and stimulating employment (72). Advocates of labour market 
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reform sought to reduce protective labour legislation (governing wages, working conditions 
or labour rights more generally) and lessen union involvement in collective bargaining 
because they were argued to create rigidities, which were harmful to enterprise 
competitiveness and discouraged job creation (72). From a neoliberal view protectionist 
approaches hindered employment by preventing wages from falling and jeopardized industry 
competitiveness by making it costly to reduce employment when it was required by changing 
economic conditions (73). Unions and protectionist policies, it was argued, also hindered 
efficiency by resisting streamlining production, improving technology and changing outdated 
job descriptions and occupational jurisdictions (72,73).  
In contrast to these dominant pro-market views, critics countered that neoliberal 
labour reforms offered short-term economic benefits and increased employment, but that 
these ‘benefits’ would result in low quality jobs and social and economic instability. 
Advocates of protectionist policies claimed that constraints on wages and dismissals 
improved rather than harmed efficiency and employment. Labour regulations restrain 
unemployment growth during recessions, stabilize labour demand in the longer term, 
encourage workers’ commitment to enterprise success, induce employers to provide and 
workers to acquire firm-specific training and skills, and promote cooperative relations in the 
workplace (74).  
Opponents of neoliberal labour reform further argued that flexible employment had 
unaccounted-for adverse affects on the mental and physical health of workers. Precarious 
employment, for instance, could lead to a lack of income, a loss of social support networks, 
and lowered self-esteem (71). Temporary workers were found to have unhealthy lifestyles 
characterized by greater cigarette and alcohol consumption, less exercise and significantly 
higher mortality rates in comparison to permanent workers. Health inequalities also 
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increased under flexible employment conditions as uneducated and low income employees 
were most often the targets of job cuts (71,75). Neoliberal labour market reforms, then, were 
argued to offer short-term economic solutions that undermined social and health conditions 
and long-term economic stability.  
2.2.4 Pension policies 
Pensions, like income, are an important determinant of health because they have 
broad psychological and physical ramifications for recipients.  Pensions affect the ability of 
beneficiaries to pay for necessities such as clothing, food and housing, and can contribute to 
a sense of security and well being for recipients (67). The lack of an adequate pension can 
also negatively affect the health of the wider family, who may be the only support for an 
elderly family member. On a broader level pension systems play a significant part in the 
economic health of a country, as they, along with health care and education, absorb the 
largest amount of social expenditure in all countries (76-78).  
While the importance of pensions to health is commonly accepted, the benefits of 
privatized versus public pension systems has become a widely contentious issue (77,78). By 
the 1980s, the financial viability of state-run pay-as-you-go11 systems was being seriously 
questioned, and Latin American governments were encouraged by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) (most importantly the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
the Inter-American Development Bank) to privatize their pension systems as an integral part 
of their SAPs (76,79-82). Theoretically, advocates argued that privatized pensions were 
                                                 
11
 In pay-as-you-go pension systems taxes collected from current workers are transferred to 
current retirees. 
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financially more viable because they were fully funded12 and were therefore not as easily 
undermined by the aging of the population (80,83). Private systems were also argued to 
generate better rates of return than public systems, which meant they required lower payroll 
taxes (81). In addition, the privatization of pensions was supposed to cut administrative costs 
by providing competition among providers and reducing payment evasion by tying pensions 
more directly to contributions (81,84).  
Private pension systems were further purported to reduce inequities found under the 
old system by being less vulnerable to manipulation for political purposes (81,82). On a 
macroeconomic level, privatization was also seen to be as a key tactic in addressing the 
devastating cutoffs of foreign capital and declining rates of domestic savings that plagued 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (78,79,81,83). Neoliberal economists argued that 
pension privatization would increase national savings and thereby reduce dependence on 
unstable foreign capital, because the contributions that workers made to the privatized 
systems were saved, whereas in pay-as-you-go systems, the social security contributions of 
active workers were spent on the pensions of current retirees (83). 
Critics of pension privatization argued against it based on both its financial and 
social implications. From an economic standpoint, privatization can create substantial 
funding deficits due to transitional costs and loss of tax revenue, and is unlikely to produce 
savings where the costs of transition are debt-financed, as the increase in private savings will 
be offset by a decrease in public savings (83,85). In addition, private systems are vulnerable 
to inflation, bankruptcy and fraud, and the state would almost certainly be obliged to cover 
some of its debts should a private institution run into financial problems (81).  
                                                 
12
 Fully funded systems collect taxes from workers when they are young, invests the 
proceeds on there behalf, and years later pay their benefits out of the accumulated principal 
and interest. 
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Along with economic uncertainties, privatizing social security has also been critiqued 
for its potential to undermine the social protection and public well being it was created to 
provide. The claimed efficiency of privatized firms is uncertain as they can lead to a 
concentration of ownership and as a result increase profits at the expense of pensioner 
returns on investments (78,86). Administrative costs in privatized systems have been found 
to increase substantially, reducing the size of funds available to retirees (85). Privatization has 
also been accused of being susceptible to abuses of rent-seeking13 behavior further reducing 
efficiency gains supposedly garnered through increased competition (78,86). Retiree benefits 
in private systems can also be affected by demographic transitions; as large cohorts begin to 
retire and sell their asset returns on investments may decline (81). 
At particular risk under a privatized system are the poor and most vulnerable 
populations (78,81,86). The working poor under a privatized system confront the prospect 
of having to pay contributions that they can’t afford. Along with low wage employees, 
atypical employees (in part-time, casual or piece-rate employment) and intermittent 
employees (frequently women with children) are often neglected in privatized schemes. 
Redistributive mechanisms and coverage of marginal populations present in public social 
security plans are often ignored in private schemes. The privatization of social security, then, 
has the potential to lead to increased economic risks and to erode public mechanisms aimed 
at the protection of the most vulnerable sectors of society.  
2.2.5 Health Care Systems 
The effects of health system reform promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in 
LMICs are similarly contentious. Favouring a market-oriented approach to health sector 
                                                 
13
 Rent seeking takes place when an entity seeks to extract uncompensated value from others 
by manipulation of the economic environment -- often including regulations or other 
government decisions.  
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reform, structural adjustment conditionalities often mandated reduced fiscal spending on 
public health care, direct cost-recovery (user fees) and community-based financing, increased 
private provision and financing, and administrative decentralization (1,30,64). Advocates 
claimed that the marketization of health care would reduce costs and increase the efficiency, 
equity and sustainability of health systems (1). Critics countered that the alleged efficiency 
benefits of these health reforms are rarely realized and that profit-oriented health care leads 
to increasing health inequities and poorer overall health provision (30,87). User fees, a SAPS-
imposed feature of public as well as private health care provision, had a disastrous impact by 
deterring the ill from seeking medical treatment and encouraging non-compliance with 
medications particularly among poorer populations.  
In some cases, the burden of medical costs have also generated and deepened 
existing poverty (1,64). The for-profit nature of private health provision can further 
compound health inequities by giving preferential service to higher income groups and 
neglecting health concerns that affect the poor. Large pharmaceutical companies, for 
example, place a low priority on research and technological development for major killers in 
low income countries such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS (30). For-profit health 
systems tend also to emphasize profitable interventions and disease specific treatments 
rather than focusing on preventative and integrated approaches that have long-term 
population benefits (1). Thus, market-oriented reforms can lead to the prioritization of 




Chapter 3 Methodology 
This comparative historical analysis (CHA) incorporates a comprehensive framework 
and enlists a variety of data sources in order to trace and explore the complex ways SAPs 
affect health. In this Chapter the methods used to analyse the economic, social and health 
effects of SAPs on Argentina and Uruguay are described.  The theoretical foundation for the 
use of CHA in the study is discussed as well as the utilization of the globalization and health 
framework to identify the countries selected, and the neoliberal reforms and outcomes to be 
analysed. Finally the Chapter examines the methodological limitations of the study and the 
data sources employed. 
3.1 Comparative Historical Analysis 
CHA is used to analyze relationships between different elements in the framework of 
globalization and health (See figure 1). CHA arose in the social sciences specifically to study 
complex social phenomena, such as globalization(89-91). Broadly speaking CHA was chosen 
because it is used to describe studies that juxtapose historical patterns across cases. More 
specifically the defining elements of CHA are its emphases on causality, processes over time 
and its use of systematic and contextualized comparison typically in a small number of 
cases(92,93). The following section will further explore what is meant by these terms and 
how they are manifested in my thesis research.  
The first key element of CHA, causality, implies that the research undertaken is 
focused on identifying and explaining causal patterns that have widespread effects(89,93). 
The two main approaches used in CHA to infer causal relationships are process tracing and 
congruence testing. Process tracing involves using empirical observations within the cases 
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that support deductions about how events are linked over time. Process tracing is reflected 
in my thesis research through the analysis of the effects of neoliberal economic reforms that 
were a part of the standard SAP packages promoted in Latin America generally, and to 
varying degrees in both of the case study countries, on the ‘pathways’ inferred by the 
framework connecting globalization and health14. Causality in this study is not achieved 
through statistical analysis, but rather through an accumulation of evidence linked along the 
causal or path dependent chains of the globalization and health framework. The causal chain 
in this study begins with the macroeconomic conditionalities of SAPs that then ‘cause’ 
certain effects within the causal chain model. The second element used in CHA to infer 
causal relationship, congruence testing, uses cross-case comparison to prove or disprove 
common patterns found within the cases through process tracing. In my thesis research 
congruence testing occurs in the juxtaposition of two nation states Argentina and Uruguay. 
The within-country pathways analysis of the phenomena of structural adjustment programs 
is used to make between country comparisons that provide a further dimension in 
understanding of the effects of SAPs on health in the countries.  
The second element central to CHA is its concern with looking at processes over 
time(89,94). Events studied in CHA are not considered to be static but rather fluid processes 
manifested over time. In my thesis research temporal considerations are central to the 
exploration of the effects of SAPs. The study period of the early 1980s to the year 2000 
tracks the implementation of SAPs and their effects within the countries as they unfold over 
the two decades. The sequence and duration of structural adjustment conditionalities and 
                                                 
14
 Hereafter references to SAPs includes both reforms that may have specifically been 
mandated as loan conditionalities and those otherwise adopted ‘voluntarily by the 
countries, though arguably due to the influence of SAPs. 
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their multifaceted effects are considered, as well as a comprehensive analysis of the historical 
events precipitating their implementation.   
The third element central to CHA is its use of systematic and contextualized 
comparison (92). This approach allows the researcher to explore and contrast the theory 
against the evidence in a way that is not as easily achieved through quantitative social 
research. In my research this technique allows for a dialogue between the abstract theory of 
Saps and its empirical historical effects within a concrete country setting. Through CHA and 
the globalization and health frameworks, the complex effects of SAPs from macro to micro 
level are considered in a manner that incorporates socio-economic, political and historical 
contexts.         
3.2 Choosing Latin America 
 
The first stage of research was equivalent to the sample selection phase in any 
standard research project. In choosing the countries for this study, there were a large number 
of potential pairs that could have been selected. Due to the impracticality of exploring all of 
these possibilities, the initial phase of the selection used a crude process to narrow down the 
prospective cases.  Of the potential regions where SAPs were implemented, Latin America 
was chosen.  Latin America has several advantages as a research area. First, it is an area of 
the world that I had more familiarity with since I had worked and studied in Central America 
for almost a year. This familiarity gave me the advantage of having some understanding of 
the history, current issues and the culture of the area that would be lacking in other parts of 
the world. Latin America also has many practical research advantages as its economic 
development level ranges from lower middle to upper middle-income countries (with the 
exception of Nicaragua, which is a low-income, least developed country) (95). Choosing 
countries from a middle-income level of development allows differences in health outcomes 
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due to SAPs to be more easily noticed than in regions (e.g. Sub Saharan Africa) that are 
made up of predominantly low-income countries where potential differences might be 
negated by the severe poverty present. In addition a middle-income region has more 
probability of having reliable and accessible data than a poorer region (4). Finally Latin 
America is also the region of the world where the greatest inequalities are found and where, 
on average since the 1980s, income inequality has tended to worsen(13,96,97). According to 
the World Bank in 2004 the richest 10 percent of the population of Latin America and the 
Caribbean earn 40 - 47 percent of total income, while the poorest tenth earn only 2-4 
percent(96). As SAPs are often critiqued for increasing income inequality, the high and 
worsening levels of inequality in Latin America make this region an important area to be 
studied.  
3.3 Selecting Argentina and Uruguay: Matched Characteristics 
The second layer of the selection process, choosing the countries, employed a more 
refined set of criteria. The first set of criteria were developed through a process of matching 
that serves a purpose similar to controlling for confounding in any standard research project. 
Matching the countries on factors that were present before SAPs were introduced (from the 
category pre-existing endowments in the globalization and health framework) allows for the 
differences being observed after SAPs were implemented to be credited to differences in the 
way SAPs were adopted rather than being attributed to other unrelated factors (e.g. 
economic development levels prior to the on set of SAPs). While theoretically matching does 
control for confounding, the vast and complex factors (e.g. geographical, cultural, political, 
economic) that are entailed in matching countries makes the selection of measures and the 
ability to control for differences a difficult task. Rather than trying to undertake an 
impossible goal of methodologically controlling for all differences, the research task was 
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more usefully aimed at developing a reasonable, and reasonably consistent set of criteria 
made up of key factors known to determine health. The characteristics on which the 
countries were matched represent key similarities (economic development level, SAPs date 
of implementation, historical political and economic development) and differences (social 
structures and domestic policies and inequality levels) in factors recognized to be important 
determinants of health. The following is a description of the similarities in the health 
determining characteristics in Argentina and Uruguay before SAPs were implemented.  
3.3.1 Upper Middle Income Countries 
The first criterion used in the selection of the countries from Latin America was their 
economic levels as categorized by the World Bank prior to the on set of SAPs. The countries 
were chosen from similar economic levels in order to reduce the chance that their differing 
financial situations would be responsible for the differences in health outcomes noted at the 
end of the study period (2000).  The countries finally chosen, Argentina and Uruguay, were 
both categorized as upper middle-income countries prior to having taken on SAPs (95). As 
the range of GNP levels that make up this category are quite broad, and GNP does not 
capture the complexity of a countries development level, this criterion only allows for an 
initially crude narrowing of country choices. The selection was further refined by considering 
GNP in conjunction with other more sensitive measures (e.g. timing of reforms, historical 
trajectory) described below.   
3.3.2 Time in which SAPs were Implemented 
Having both countries implement SAPs at comparable times provides a better 
chance that their impacts will have had an equal opportunity to become observable in the 
health data. This measure recognizes that the impacts of economic interventions like SAPs 
are often delayed and require time to manifest themselves. This criterion also ensures that 
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the countries were facing similar external conditions during the time period in which they 
were both adopting SAPs. Chile, for instance, in the aftermath of the overthrow of 
Allende15, adopted SAPs voluntarily more than a decade earlier than most other Latin 
American countries (34,42). Comparing the impacts of SAPs on health in Chile to another 
country that adopted SAPs during the 1980s would leave the possibility that observed 
differences could be due to the political, economic, or technological differences between the 
two decades. In the selected countries Argentina and Uruguay, difficulties in debt repayment 
and government revenue had periodically been encountered before the 1970s and as a result 
both countries had had limited conditionalities imposed by the IMF over this decade.  The 
debt crisis and the resulting onset of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s marked a 
drastic increase in the intensity of the reforms that were required of both countries by the 
IMF and the World Bank. The selection of Argentina and Uruguay for the case study 
reduces many of the possible biases that differing time periods could introduce into the 
interpretation of the health outcomes of the countries.     
3.3.3 Economic Development History   
Another important similarity shared by Argentina and Uruguay was the historical 
development of the economy of the countries. Argentina and Uruguay share economic roots 
that were based on the exportation of primary products abroad and the importation of 
manufactured goods(44,98). During the late 19th and early 20th centuries the economies of 
the two countries began to excel based on the export of cattle, sheep and grain products to 
England. Argentina especially experienced rapid economic growth due to its abundant 
natural resources. While this period was generally prosperous, dependence on demand and 
                                                 
15 Salvador Allende (1970-1973) was the social democratic president of Chile ousted in 1973 
with support from the CIA to prevent what the US perceived as another ‘socialist’ foothold 
in Latin America.  
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foreign capital from industrialized countries caused the economy to fluctuate. Their 
vulnerability to the world market became acutely apparent in the 1930s when the world 
depression caused an economic crisis in both countries. 
In reaction to the depression of the 1930s, Uruguay and Argentina along with other 
Latin American countries introduced ISI policies(43). As already discussed, these policies 
encouraged inner-directed development through strong government intervention; the intent 
was to produce manufactured goods internally that formerly had been imported from 
Europe. In Argentina in 1930 domestic manufactures provided less than 9 percent of 
Argentina’s total consumption of textiles, but by 1943 their share rose to 82 percent(44). ISI 
policies were initially successful in generating economic growth and improving social 
conditions but economic problems began to surface in both countries by the mid 1950s and 
early 60s(4,49). ISI policies had not broken dependence on developed world economies 
since the policies relied upon imported capital goods such as machinery (4). The funding of 
capital goods through loans led to a growing trade deficit as returns on investments were 
lower than the interest rates being charged on loans. Over-valued exchange rates exacerbated 
the problem since these firms could not find external markets for their high priced goods. 
Though ISI was leading to better socio-economic status for these countries, it was 
simultaneously spiralling them into greater debt (43).  
The 1970s marked yet another transition in Argentina’s and Uruguay’s economic 
policy. In 1973 in Uruguay and in 1975 in Argentina the military took power (43,44,98). 
During the military rule in the countries the inward looking import substitution model was 
replaced with an export-led model of economic growth.  This model had many similarities to 
neoliberal economic theory in that it advocated the deregulation of finance and trade and a 
reduced role of the state in the economy. Economic growth during this period relied on 
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external borrowing to finance expansion of the export sector of the economy, which in turn 
led to an increasing foreign debt. The foreign debt burden of the countries was exacerbated 
by quadrupling oil prices and rising interest rates that finally culminated in the debt crisis of 
the early 1980’s(43,44,98). Uruguay’s foreign debt went from $515 million in 1976 to $2.26 
billion by April 1981 and Argentina’s foreign debt had reached $43 billion16 by the end of 
1982(98). In 1982 Argentina and Uruguay negotiated emergency loans and entered into 
structural reforms with the IMF (44).  
3.3.3 Racial and Ethnic Composition 
A further similarity between the countries was the development of the racial and 
ethnic composition of the countries. Uruguay and Argentina are countries of primarily 
European ancestry (44,98). Both countries were colonized by Spain in the 1500s and during 
the economic boom of the late 1800’s and early 1900’s massive amounts of immigrants from 
Spain and Italy came to fill the demand for labour. Today more than 90 percent of 
Argentineans and Uruguayans are said to be of Spanish or Italian heritage. Unlike other 
Latin American countries, there are few people of indigenous heritage left in either country.  
3.4 Argentina and Uruguay: Key Differences  
In addition to matching countries on health determining characteristics before SAPs 
were implemented, key differences between the countries were used in the selection of the 
cases. An important aspect of the study is its focus on domestic policies and their ability to 
mitigate the negative health impacts of SAPs. In choosing two countries for the study, 
differences in the historical development of their domestic policies before SAPs was used as 
a good predictor of possible differences in the way the countries might implement the 
adjustment policies. As a common critique of SAPs is the negative impact it has on the social 
                                                 
16
 All monetary figures, unless otherwise stated, are in US dollars. 
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well being of countries, a country’s historical emphasis (or lack thereof) on policies that 
protect the social interests of its citizens was seen as an important factor to be considered.  
Countries that put a greater importance on social issues in their domestic policies were 
hypothesized as being more likely to retain this emphasis after SAPs were introduced than 
would be countries without this historical foundation. The following is a brief contrast and 
comparison of the differences and similarities in the development of Argentina and 
Uruguay’s domestic policies and social structures.  
3.4.1 Social Structures and Domestic Policies 
Uruguay and Argentina’s domestic policies and social structures share many similar 
origins but they have also emerged as modern states with important differences. Both 
countries share similar roots as colonies of Spain in the 1500s (44,98). As in other Latin 
American countries the colonial economy created a system in which the white ruling class 
dominated first Indian labour, then cattle and land. Demand for manufactured goods that 
the local economy remained unable to produce also gave a monopoly power to merchants 
who supplied these goods from abroad and to the urban areas that developed to supply 
these imports.  
In the modern state of Uruguay and Argentina many of these legacies of colonialism 
remain. In both countries the majority of land is still owned by a wealthy minority, economic 
growth is still connected to foreign capital and markets, and both countries are largely urban 
countries dominated by their capital cities: Montevideo and Buenos Aires, respectively 
(43,44,98). Despite these similarities Uruguay’s and Argentina’s social development began to 
diverge in important ways in the 1800’s at which time Uruguay progressed in a more 






Uruguay has often been characterized as the Switzerland of South America (98).  It is 
a remarkable Latin American country in that relative to most other countries it has 
historically had a stable democracy, high literacy rate, large urban middle class, and relatively 
even income distribution. The uniquely peaceful and socially minded nature of Uruguay’s 
modern state began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th century. By the late 1800s 
Uruguay was economically prosperous and had developed relative stability, a secular 
government and an advanced public educational system. These progressive elements in 
Uruguay’s development were followed by a welfare state that emerged under the presidency 
of Jose Batlle Y Ordonez (1903-07 and 1911-15). Batlle instituted a democratic welfare-
oriented polity based on a vision of centralization and redistribution, which resulted in old 
age pensions, worker protections, state monopoly of finance and other sectors, and public 
assistance for women, children and the poor. Aside from a brief relatively peaceful 
breakdown in constitutional rule from 1933 to 1938 Uruguay maintained a stable democratic 
government that continued to follow the social vision of Batlle into the 1960s.   
In sharp contrast to the traditionally equitable and peaceful development of the 
country, Uruguay over the 1960s and 70s descended into a military dictatorship that eroded 
its social policy, and dramatically increased violence and inequities in the country (98). The 
dictatorship of 1973 to 1985 operated under a doctrine of national security that saw its 
purpose in eradicating socialist institutions and policies created under the Batllista welfare 
state. One of the central aims of the military became the destruction of the labour 
movement and the cleansing of leftist influences in the social, educational, and moral 
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structures of society. During the dictatorship there were approximately 90 deaths and 44 
disappearances and it is estimated that 10 percent of Uruguay’s population fled the country. 
In 1985 the end of the military regime left a deteriorated infrastructure, an impoverished 
middle class and a legacy of human rights violations.  
3.4.1.2 Argentina 
In contrast to Uruguay’s early adoption of social policy, Argentina’s development 
was heavily influenced by the political agenda of wealthy landowners who controlled both 
the army and the elections (43,44). Argentina experienced significant economic growth that 
facilitated some upward mobility at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries; 
the political and economic dominance of aristocrats, however, resulted in huge income 
disparities. Tensions between the working class and the elite led to protests and strikes by 
labour that were violently suppressed. In 1930 a military coup took place and from 1930 on 
democratic government was interrupted by frequent military coups. Between the military 
coup of 1930 and 1976 only one freely elected government managed to complete its term.  
Although Argentina was more dominated by an aristocracy aligned with the military, 
it also experienced an important period in which popular government prevailed(43,44).  
Over the 1930s and 1940s, while the military maintained a growing influence over the 
political system, class-consciousness was growing. Juan Peron, a middle class army Colonel, 
campaigned for the presidency from a nationalist and populist platform; in 1946 he was 
elected president and was re-elected again in 1951. From 1946 – 55 Peron, before he was 
ousted by the military, implemented dramatic social reforms that improved employment 
conditions, education and health care for workers. During this period Argentina developed 
the largest middle class on the continent and established a powerful union organization, the 
General Confederation of Labour.  
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Over the two decades following Peron’s departure Argentina again descended into 
political turmoil that culminated in an extremely violent and repressive military dictatorship 
in the 1970s (43,44). After the military took power in 1956 social and political divisions 
between the left and the right grew increasingly tense and volatile. A severe stabalization 
plan was implemented that increased income inequalities in the country. Another military 
coup took place in 1966 that was only broken by a brief period of democracy from 1973-
1976.  From 1976-83 the military engaged in a “dirty war” against their opponents in which 
massive arrests and the disappearances of anywhere from 10 to 20 thousand people took 
place.  In addition to the brutal internal war, in 1982 the Argentine government invaded the 
Falkland Islands but was quickly defeated by the British. Following their defeat the 
Argentine military government faced increasing public resistance along with worsening 
economic conditions that eventually led to the return of a civilian government in 1983.  
In summary, Argentina and Uruguay’s history demonstrated significant differences in 
their democratic stability, tradition of social policies and history of violence. Uruguay 
adopted strong social democratic policies in the early 1900s that were largely maintained 
until the military take over in the 1970s (98). In contrast Argentina was dominated by upper 
class interests in the early 1900s and only implemented social democratic policies during the 
presidency of Peron in 1946-1955 which were aggressively reversed under the military 
regimes that followed (43,44). Uruguay’s history was also largely peaceful and democratic 
only interrupted by a brief and relatively peaceful military takeover in the 1930s and the 
more violent dictatorship in the 1970s (98). The 1900s in Argentina, in contrast, were riddled 
with violence and unrest with frequent military coups that culminated in a brutal military 
takeover in the 1970s (43,44).  Argentina’s history was to a large degree characterized by 
greater inequity, violence and military intervention that differed substantially from Uruguay’s 
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generally more peaceful, democratic and social democratic progression, likely resulting in 
significant differences in the way SAPs were adopted by and affected the countries 
(43,44,98).   
3.4.2 Inequality Data 
   Along with the differences in the historical development of the domestic policies and 
social structures of the countries before SAPs were introduced, differences in the 
progression of income inequality in the countries after SAPs were implemented was another 
key factor in the choice of the countries. At the beginning of the 1980s Argentina and 
Uruguay both had similar levels of income inequality; by the end of the 1990’s Uruguay’s 
inequality improved while Argentina’s worsened. Data from the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) show that the percentage of income in the 
poorest quartile in Argentina went from 9.3 in 1980 to 7.5 in 1997, and in Uruguay from 9.3 
in 1981 to 11.9 in 1997(99). As increasing inequalities is a common critique of SAPs, 
Uruguay’s improving and Argentina’s worsening equality point to possible differences in 
their domestic policies and their ability to buffer the negative impacts of SAPs. The differing 
inequality data along with the differing historical emphasis on social policies provides further 
evidence that a comparison of Argentina and Uruguay’s domestic policies may provide 
important insights into how to preserve social and health interests of the public in the face 
of neoliberal economic policies.    
3.5 Population Health Analysis: Health Determinants and Outcomes 
 In this section, a discussion is given of the specific population health determinants 
and outcomes that will be used to measure the cumulative population health effects of the 
neoliberal reforms outlined in Chapter 1. The health determinants chosen include economic 
growth, inflation, debt, inequality, poverty, and the health outcomes are infant mortality rate 
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(IMR) and under five mortality rate (IMR). These indicators were chosen because they create 
a comprehensive picture of population health in the countries through an examination of 
broad economic and social determinants and because of their corresponding relationship to 
the health outcomes. Economic growth, inflation and debt affect and are reciprocally 
affected by poverty and inequality which, in turn, are strongly linked to infant and under 5 
mortality. A collective exploration of these complex and interrelated health determinants and 
health outcomes provides a representative depiction of the overall population health of the 
countries and validates and strengthens the interpretation of the health outcomes. What 
follows is a discussion of the importance of the chosen indicators to health and their 
connection to the other health determinants.  
3.5.1 Economic Growth 
Looking at the economic effects of neoliberal reforms is imperative since the 
economy functions as an important health determinant (100). A country’s economic activity, 
its place in the international economy and the approach taken by its government to issues as 
diverse as economic development, trade and taxation all affect the socio-economic 
conditions and consequently health status and distribution within a country (55). How 
economic health is measured and the importance it is given, though, continues to be 
controversial. From a neoliberal economic viewpoint an emphasis on economic growth 
measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) emerged as a central aspect of not only 
economic development but also social well-being through growth’s presumed alleviation of 
poverty and inequality(36,101). Chen and Berlinguer have noted that advocates of growth 
argue that “ a rising tide of wealth lifts all boats, leading to health advancement and equity” 
(30). On the other hand, this narrow focus on aggregate economic growth has been critiqued 
because it does not take into account the need for redistributive mechanisms, public 
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investment, and environmental protection. Under this alternative rationale “a rising tide 
could lift big yachts, but capsize small dinghies” (30). Problems with GDP as an economic 
indicator of well-being have also arisen as it captures both destructive and beneficial causes 
of growth in goods and services and is not able to take into account activity in the informal 
economy(102). While GDP is a controversial and limited measure of economic well-being it 
is still an important aspect to examine as it was a central goal of neoliberal reforms in the 
countries examined (4). Judging the effects of SAPs’ reforms, then, requires assessing 
whether at the very least they achieved their own aspirations. Use of GDP as one among 
several economic, social and health indicators also allows a more comprehensive 
understanding of the effects of these neoliberal policies on the countries.   
3.5.2 Inflation  
Inflation is another important economic outcome because economic stability (which 
is undermined by high inflation) was a central goal of neoliberal austerity measures and plays 
a significant role in the economic performance and consequent economic health of a country 
(67,103). Inflation is the persistent rise over time in the average price of goods and services 
or in what is often referred to as “the cost of living”. The most widely used measure of 
inflation is the consumer price index (CPI)(104). It reflects changes in the price of a 
representative "basket" of goods and services sold in the country. The inflation rate is 
expressed as a percentage increase in average prices over a year. When the CPI rises the 
purchasing power of the average consumer falls.  
The cost of high and unstable inflation can be severe as it undermines the economy’s 
ability to generate long-lasting growth and job creation (104). It also creates uncertainty for 
consumers and investors and can lead to painful cycles of economic “boom and bust” that 
cause hardship for many people (104). Inflation debilitates a country’s ability to provide 
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public social services because tax revenues fall and economic uncertainties hinder budgetary 
planning (67). This often leads to an erosion in essential services that affect the most 
vulnerable sectors of society. In addition high inflation erodes the value of incomes and 
savings. People on fixed incomes, the elderly and the poor, are particularly vulnerable to 
inflation (104,105). Low wage earners and the less educated, for instance, are less likely to 
have the bargaining power to be able to have their wages adjusted for inflation (67,106). 
Inflation also taxes the poor more heavily because they hold proportionately more of their 
money in cash and are less able to protect their wealth through domestic indexed or foreign-
denominated financial instruments (67).  
3.5.3 Debt 
Another key measure of economic performance relative to neoliberal reforms is the 
development of debt(49,107). Repayment of developing world debts was a central reason for 
implementing neoliberal reforms; a country’s debt burden also has serious implications for 
the health of its people (4,107,108). The effects of debt on the economic systems of a 
country and consequently on its health outcomes are complex and include many factors. The 
most obvious implication of debt has been the significant and increasing outflow of capital 
to industrialized countries that were the principle lenders to finance the external debt (109). 
According to the World Bank: "Before 1982 the highly indebted countries received about 2 
percent of GNP a year in resources from abroad; since then they have transferred roughly 3 
percent of GNP a year in the opposite direction" (109). The problem became so pervasive 
that even agencies whose ostensible purposes included aiding the indebted countries were 
draining capital: in 1987 "the IMF received about $8.6 billion more in loan repayments and 
interest charges than it lent out" (109). Most of the increase in the foreign debts of 
developing countries during the 1990s was to pay interest on existing loans (55). In six of the 
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eight years from 1990 to 1997, developing countries paid out more in debt service than they 
received in new loans – a net transfer from the ‘poor South’ to the ‘rich North’ of $77 billion 
(55). In addition to the moral affront of this reality it is also counter intuitive to set up a 
system in which developing countries attempting to recover and reconstruct themselves after 
the debt crisis are paying out more to service foreign debts than they will ever receive in 
emergency aid (110).  
Generating funds for debt repayment has had significant implications for indebted 
countries. In order to generate money to pay debts expenditure reducing policies have been 
undertaken to cut public expenditure. Socially this has directly affected countries through the 
reduction of spending on social safety nets and infrastructure which often most negatively 
affect the poor. Not only did these expenditure reductions have harmful social consequences 
on people in affected countries; they also had serious consequences for the prospects of 
renewed growth as decreasing investment inhibited productivity (111). In addition countries 
often had to take on new loans to pay off old loans(43). In this way the debt crisis has had a 
self-reinforcing dynamic that has continued to increase the debt burden and accentuate the 
mounting human costs. 
3.5.4 Poverty 
Research on the relationship between poverty and health has left little doubt that 
poverty leads to ill health (112,113). The effects of poverty on the health of individuals can 
be ascribed to both its social consequences in feelings of risk, powerlessness, vulnerability, 
and low self-esteem, as well as to the absolute effect of material deprivation (56). People 
with limited access to income are more likely to be socially isolated, have fewer opportunities 
for early childhood development and later education, and have poor access to drinking 
water, health care services and housing. In addition, poor people are more likely to suffer 
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from environmental degradation, discrimination, have a larger number of children, unwanted 
pregnancies and be more vulnerable to addictions (114). An examination of the demographic 
breakdown of poverty reveals that gender, age and race are also key factors in understanding 
poverty (115). Women, the elderly, children and non-white ethnic groups make up a 
disproportionate number of those living in poverty and are often more susceptible to 
experiencing the negative effects of economic crisis (9,67,96,115).  
Examining poverty is important but difficult due to the inescapable degree of 
arbitrariness in the establishment of poverty lines that could have a great impact on the 
number of people who are defined as poor (116). In low-income countries a large part of the 
population is likely to have incomes close to the poverty line and so a small variation in the 
definition of that line could significantly affect the numbers reported. Poverty also typically 
has been thought of in terms of access to resources, but alternative measures have been 
developed that include economic, structural, socio-cultural and geographic elements (117). 
Even with traditional poverty measures that focus on income, the income measures on 
which they are based can vary widely. Some countries report only labour earnings, for 
example, while others report both earned and nonearned income (67). The variety of 
definitions and measurements of poverty can make it difficult to achieve comparability 
across countries and over time. For the sake of this study a comprehensive analysis of the 
poverty measures available for Argentina and Uruguay is not possible. Instead a summary of 
the literature on aggregate poverty measures for the countries is presented with an example 
of poverty using the measure from ECLAC. ECLAC is used because it provides a 
consistently measured indicator over the 20 year time period for both countries, facilitating 
an easier and more reliable comparison of the two countries.    
3.5.5 Inequality 
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While poverty is an important outcome to be measured, it fails to capture the affects 
of neoliberal reforms on income distribution at all levels of society. Increasingly not only 
poverty but the degree of inequality that exists in countries is being recognized as an 
important determinant of health(118). Ironically, from a neoliberal perspective it was initially 
argued that focusing on changing the incidence of poverty is more important than worrying 
about altering income distribution (119,120). Economic growth was thought to be the 
solution to poverty alleviation and stressing income redistribution would slow investment 
and growth and therefore negatively affect the poor (120). This argument has some historical 
merit since, for example, Latin American countries through the 1960s seemed to be on their 
way to eradicating poverty through growth without redistributing wealth (121). However the 
theory that growth automatically reduces poverty has been generally refuted by repeated 
examples of countries who simultaneously experienced increased poverty and growth 
(36,120).  
The neoliberal emphasis on poverty reduction over inequality reduction also neglects 
to consider that well-being can depend on relative as well as absolute poverty (121). To start 
with, inequalities have powerful but subtle psychological implications that have positive and 
negative consequences for health. Social status, for instance, is strongly connected to a sense 
of personal efficacy. In general, higher social position is associated with a greater belief in 
one’s ability to positively affect life circumstances and lower social status with a sense of 
powerlessness and lack of control (122). Moreover, the experience of poverty can also be 
worse in a society with greater inequities. The presence of wealth in society, for example, 
encourages merchants to sell more expensive products that are more profitable lessening the 
ability of lower income people to access goods that meet their basic needs at affordable 
prices (119).  
 45
Inequality is affected not only by the economic, political and social contexts but has 
a reciprocal effect on these contexts. Countries with more equal income distribution, for 
example, tend to have higher growth rates and greater democratic stability (67,119). 
Additionally, income inequality also can contribute to and perpetuate poverty. Latin 
American poverty, for example, has often been called “unnecessary poverty” as very little 
poverty would exist if incomes were more evenly distributed (121). Addressing inequities, 
then, is an important aspect of achieving health on its own and is also interconnected with 
poverty, economic growth and stability that collectively have a significant impact on health 
(96). 
3.5.6 Infant Mortality and Under Five Mortality 
Two bellwether health measures are under 5 mortality (<5 MR) and infant mortality 
rates (IMR). These were used to measure the effects of neoliberal policies on the health of 
Argentina and Uruguay. These measures were chosen both because of their ability to provide 
a reliable indication of the overall well-being of countries, and because of the lack of other 
reliable comparable data. Research for over the last 100 years has used IMR as an indirect 
overall indicator of economic, social and environmental development in countries because of 
its sensitivity to changes in economic and social conditions (123). The correlation between 
IMR and these variables historically has been so consistent and close that they have been 
viewed as either directly or indirectly causative .  
IMR and <5MR are caused by many complex variables but its most notable and 
commonly accepted determinant is poverty. Low economic status is generally related to IMR 
and <5MR because of its association with risk factors such as lack of education, sanitation, 
clean water and nutrition (124). Income inequality also has been found to be strongly 
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associated with these indicators, because of its negative impacts on social cohesion and its 
association with decreased state spending on health care (125,126).  
While it is generally accepted that childhood and infant health are important 
reflections of health throughout life and that infant and children’s health is a sensitive 
measure of a countries progress, the use of IMR and <5MR as an accurate measure of infant 
and childhood health and as a surrogate measure of the overall health of a country has 
become controversial. Even though this indicator has been useful in the past, its 
interpretation today has become less reliable as it has become possible to alter the number of 
deaths of children below one year old as a direct result of the application of specific 
techniques that do not require economic and social improvements (123). The 
encouragement of breast feeding, the use of oral rehydration, and immunization against 
infectious diseases, for instance, can reduce the IMR without changing the prevalence of 
illnesses, disabilities or the extent of human deprivation that exists. 
While the limitations of these indicators are important to recognize as they could 
falsely mask or amplify the progress in health of a country, undertaking a comparative case 
study reduces some of these concerns. As Argentina and Uruguay both come from similar 
economic development levels and have had long established social and health systems, 
targeted health interventions would likely be equally available to both countries eliminating 
them as possible causes for differences in mortality rates(95). In addition even if the 
difference in IMR and <5MR were due to the presence of targeted interventions in one of 
the countries, this could to some degree reflect the different implementation of neoliberal 
reforms within the countries. In Argentina, for instance, as will be elaborated on in Chapter 
4, problems with inflation and the implementation of fiscal austerity in the 1980s had a 
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significant impact on the ability of the health system to operate effectively and put their 
immunization program in serious jeopardy (127). 
3.6 Methodological Challenges 
The complexity of factors involved in undertaking a country case comparison raises 
many unique and distinct challenges. A key example of this complexity is the use of 
matching to control for confounding in the study. While matching allows for controlling of 
confounding by the factors that the countries have been matched on, the diverse and 
complex nature of a country will inevitably result in unaccounted for differences between the 
countries that will need to be considered in the study analysis. Differences between the 
countries in factors other than the way they adopted SAPs could lead to a misinterpretation 
of the country’s successes or failures in implementing SAPs.  
In addition to the inherent difficulty in matching countries on their health 
determining factors, using countries as cases raises possible concerns about their level of 
interdependence. In the context of an increasingly globalized modern world, it is important 
to recognize the growing interdependence that countries are experiencing.  In looking at 
health issues, environmental pollution, economic crisis and infectious diseases are all 
examples of factors that transcend the borders of the countries in which they originate. In 
looking more specifically at Argentina and Uruguay their close geographical position and 
historical ties intensify the possibility of the internal issues and events of one country 
affecting the choices and circumstances of the other.  Taking into account the impact that 
the countries have on each other is a necessary piece of the analysis, as the more 
interdependent the countries are, the greater are the chances that any possible differences in 
health outcomes will be diminished.   
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 3.6.1 Size/Population/Terrain/Climate  
Argentina and Uruguay have important similarities and differences that make them 
good choices for a comparative case study, but there remain obvious differences between 
the countries that could interfere with the accuracy of the study. One of the most easily 
observable differences between Argentina and Uruguay is size. Uruguay is the smallest 
country in South America with a land area covering approximately 72,000 square miles while 
Argentina is the second largest country in South America covering 1,056,636 square miles 
(44,98). Argentina’s population of 39,537,943 is also significantly larger than Uruguay’s 
population of 3,415,920. Along with the dramatic differences in size and population the 
countries also have very different terrain. Argentina’s territory is richly diverse possessing 
mountains, plains, forests and beaches while Uruguay’s largely level, open landscape shares 
the flatness of the Argentinean pampas but not the richness of its soil. Uruguay is almost 
totally bordered by water and its land is made up of mostly grasslands, 90 percent of which 
are capable of growing crops. Even though Uruguay lies next to Argentina, Argentina’s long 
triangular shape stretches north almost to the tropic of Capricorn and south to Antarctica 
making its weather much more diverse than Uruguay’s generally temperate climate. 
Temperatures in Argentina vary from subtropical in the north to cold and windswept in the 
south, with mild and dry areas found throughout much of the country. Argentina’s greater 
size, population, diverse climate and terrain create significant differences in the possible 
health issues that it could encounter in comparison to Uruguay’s smaller more uniform land 
and climate. Argentina, for instance, may experience problems in health care delivery and 
other services in less accessible and remote regions, and may face more diverse health 
problems due to differences in climate that may not be an issue in a smaller more 
homogeneous country like Uruguay. These differences may complicate the interpretation of 
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the study by giving a false impression of worsening health outcomes in Argentina that may 
be due to its greater size and diversity rather than to differences in its domestic policies. 
3.6.2 Foreign Relations 
While there are many advantages in choosing country cases with similar 
characteristics like Argentina and Uruguay their close proximity, cultural and political ties can 
also jeopardize their independence and reduce the ability of the study to find a difference in 
their health outcomes. Uruguay and Argentina’s development has been historically 
interconnected though their effect on each other has not been equal due to Argentina’s 
greater size and power (44,98). Uruguay’s early development was shaped by conflict between 
Spain/Argentina and Portugal/Brazil over possession of its territory and it has remained a 
fragile buffer between the South America’s two major powers of Argentina and Brazil (98). 
In many ways Uruguay has maintained a remarkably unique and distinct character that has 
resisted the more violent and conflict-ridden path taken by its neighbors. But, despite its 
independent development, pressures from Argentina have influenced the domestic affairs of 
Uruguay. A key example of this influence is the authoritarian regime in Argentina in the 
1960s which supported the military government that came to power in Uruguay. Uruguay’s 
vulnerability to the external pressures of Argentina undermines the independence of the two 
country cases and weakens the ability of the study to find differences in their adoption of 
SAPs and resulting health outcomes. 
Another factor that jeopardizes the independence of Uruguay and Argentina as case 
studies is their economic ties to each other. Bilateral trade agreements that arose in the mid 
seventies tied much of Uruguay’s exports to Argentina and Brazil and the development of 
the regional trade agreement Mercosur in the 1990s continued to deepen Uruguay’s 
dependence on this market (128,129).  Uruguay is also dependent on Argentina for foreign 
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investment. In 1980 and 1981 for instance the financial crisis in Argentina further added to 
the economic problems of Uruguay by virtually eliminating the real estate investment from 
Argentina; a major source of foreign investment for Uruguay (98). As Uruguay’s markets are 
very small in comparison to Argentina fluctuations in Uruguay’s economy have only a very 
minimal reciprocal effect on Argentina. In comparing the impact of SAPs on Uruguay and 
Argentina the susceptibility of Uruguay to fluctuations in Argentina’s economy could reduce 
the ability of the study to find a difference in their resulting health outcomes.    
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Chapter 4: Focusing On Selected Reforms 
 
 The following Chapter explores the neoliberal reforms adopted in Argentina and 
Uruguay over the 1980s and 1990s, the most critical period in which SAPs were 
implemented. This Chapter builds a representative picture of the neoliberal reforms to 
domestic policies undergone during the implementation of SAPs in these two countries, 
using a sample of social, economic and health policy areas. These policy areas include trade, 
privatization, labour market, pension and health care, the health-rationale for each having 
been explored in the first Chapter. The analysis compares and contrasts the differences in 
the pace, intensity, and comprehensiveness of the reforms adopted and explores the effects 
of these changes on the reformed sector.  
4.1 Trade Reforms  
4.1.1 Argentina’s Trade Reforms in the 1980s: Deterring imports, reducing tariffs and 
quantitative controls  
 
In the latter part of the 1980s a moderate form of trade liberalization was initiated in 
Argentina under the newly elected democratic government led by President Raul Alfonsin 
(1983-1989) after a failed attempt under the previous military regime (41,44). The main goal 
of trade reform in this period was focused on generating a large trade-surplus in order to 
appease IFIs, private banks and the US who were pressuring Argentina to make prompt 
payments on the rapidly increasing debt (41,130). As the economic problems of the 1980s 
made the prospect of increasing exports through new foreign investment unlikely, much of 
the trade surpluses had to be attained by curtailing imports through IMF-supported austerity 
measures (41). Domestic demand for imported goods was suppressed by reducing 
government spending, raising taxes and increasing interest rates (44,116).  
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While Argentina deterred the demand for imports to develop a trade surplus to pay 
its debt, SAPs also advocated for reduced barriers to imports in order to decrease the price 
of inputs necessary for exportation (130). With this goal in mind Argentina dismantled 
quantitative controls and tariff distortions (130,131). Nominal import tariffs were reduced 
from an average of 45 percent in 1987 to 29 percent at the end of 1988 (129,129,132). In 
addition non-tariff measures were reduced through the elimination of specific duties and 
quantitative restrictions17 (129,131,133).  
Greater exports were also advocated under SAPs in order to increase foreign 
currency. Export tariffs were reduced to encourage exportation from 1986 to 1988 but were 
increased in 1983, 1985 and 1989 for fiscal reasons. From 1985 to 1988 basic export 
incentives such as tax rebates and new incentives in the form of subsidies related to export 
performance were implemented to further promote exportation (133,134). Along with 
unilateral trade liberalization, bilateral trade liberalization was increased moderately over the 
1980s. Trade was intensified through 24 bilateral trade agreements with Brazil negotiated 
between 1984 and 1990 (133,135). Between 1986 and 1994 Brazil became Argentina’s main 
trading partner, and the share of Argentina’s exports directed to Brazil grew from 6 percent 
in the mid-1980s to over 20 per cent in the mid-1990s (133). 
4.1.2 Trade Reform Effects in Argentina in the 1980s: Trade surpluses and export 
diversification 
 An examination of trade liberalization over the 1980s reveals that it had both 
positive and negative impacts on Argentina’s economy. One of the key successes that 
Argentina experienced was strong positive trade balances, which peaked at $8.3 billion in 
                                                 
17 A quantitative restriction puts a numerical limit on the annual import quantity of a given 
good. 
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1990 (136). Recession and hyperinflation severely reduced imports after 1987, but exports 
expanded sharply--led in part by the successful export efforts of Argentina’s steel and 
petroleum industries (137). Exports were also diversified; by 1990 industrial exports had 
increased to almost equal the level of the traditional agricultural exports.  
While trade liberalization in the 1980s succeeded in producing a trade surplus and 
increasing the participation of industry in export markets, these benefits were accompanied 
by poor trade growth, the erosion of manufacturing sectors and in particular the devastation 
of small and medium sized firms. Despite the trade surplus achieved between 1983 and 1990 
overall export growth remained poor with Argentina achieving 6.7 percent growth per 
annum, well below the 10.1 percent annual growth rate recorded by world exports (138). A 
closer look at the effect on industry also reveals that the bulk of exports were represented by 
a small number of sectors dominated by a few multinational firms. The vast majority of 
Argentine producers participated little in the international market and many smaller firms 
disappeared while large conglomerates expanded (137). The chronic inflation in the 1980s 
additionally forced industries to focus on self-preservation instead of investing in 
modernization.  
4.1.3 Argentina’s Trade Reforms in the 1990s: Accelerated unilateral and regional 
liberalization 
In the 1990s the rate of unilateral and regional trade liberalization accelerated 
dramatically with the election of President Menem (1989- 1999). Faced with hyperinflation 
and spiralling debt, macroeconomic stability, increased investment and a sustainable process 
of high growth became the goals of adjustment in Argentina during Menem’s term (130).  In 
this context a more extreme approach to trade liberalization was initiated with the intention 
of reorienting investment toward tradable activities in order to earn the foreign currencies 
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Argentina needed (130,133,139). Unilateral trade liberalization advanced rapidly in the first 
term of Menem’s administration. In 1991, the remaining quantitative restrictions on imports 
were eliminated and the average nominal import tariff was lowered from 29 percent in 1988 
to around 13 percent in 1994 (129,130). Tariffs on exports were also eliminated after 1990 
and a number of export promotion mechanisms were introduced, including a tax rebate for 
exporters which was raised to as much as 20 percent (130,133).  
From 1995 onwards, trade policies in Argentina were further radically advanced 
through its integration into the regional trade agreement, Mercosur. This regional trade 
liberalization process began with the treaty of Asuncion signed in 1991 between Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay with the goals of achieving the free circulation of goods, services and 
productive factors among the member countries through the elimination of tariff and non- 
tariff restrictions. The process of tariff elimination was progressively implemented until it 
reached a zero tariff state by the end of 1994, with temporary exceptions made for a limited 
number of products and the sugar and automotive sectors that were to be integrated into 
Mercosur by 1999.  Mercosur also established the adoption of a Common External Tariff 
(CET) and a common commercial policy with non-Mercosur countries that was adopted in 
1995. Except for temporary exceptions granted to certain imports scheduled to be integrated 
into CET by 2001, the average CET tariff was fixed at approximately 11 percent although 
tariff levels were allowed to vary between 0 and 20 percent across industries (129). Through 
unilateral trade liberalization and Mercosur, Menem’s government succeeded in significantly 
advancing the assimilation of Argentina into the world economy.  
 55
4.1.4 Effects of Trade Reforms Argentina in the 1990s: Trade growth and trade 
deficits 
While trade liberalization was radically advanced over the 1990s it did not lead to the 
productive and dynamic export sector that had been anticipated. Trade in Argentina 
generally increased over the 1990s but intra-regional trade increased significantly more than 
trade with non-Mercosur countries. By 1999 Brazil accounted for around one-third of 
Argentina’s overseas trade (133). In both Mercosur and non-Mercosur countries imports 
also rose at a much faster rate than exports resulting in a trade deficit. Argentina’s export to 
the world increased 157 percent from 1990 to 1997 while imports increased 713.81 percent 
over the same period (135). Exports and imports with Mercosur countries increased by 
490.78 percent and 856.96 percent respectively from 1990 to 1997 (135). A central problem 
with foreign trade resulted from the increasingly overvalued Argentine peso, which led to 
growing consumer and industrial consumption of imports and a consequently rising trade 
deficit (139).  
There was also a growing reliance on primary export commodities and a subsequent 
reduction of industrial exports over the period, due in part to the inability of manufacturing 
to compete in an unprotected market (139). Primary commodities, while they were seen to 
be the area in which Argentina’s natural comparative advantage lay, were more volatile in 
terms of earnings on the world market, and produced lower quality jobs (140). While 
productivity increased in the 1990s in Argentina, this increase was a result of labour saving 
restructuring rather than a large expansion in output (141). As in the 1980s, small and 
medium sized firms also suffered greatly under liberalization. The evolution of trade in 
Argentina in the 1990s made it clear that exports were incapable of solving the economic 
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problems of the country and in conjunction with other reforms had actually contributed to 
further worsening Argentina’s financial position (139). 
4.1.5 Uruguay’s Trade reform in the 1980s: Gradual unilateral trade reform and 
significant bilateral trade reform 
 
As in Argentina, a gradual approach to trade liberalization was undertaken in 
Uruguay in the 1980s. In the context of the debt crisis, the newly elected democratic 
government under President Sanguinetti (1985-1989) planned to revive the failing economy 
through an export-led growth model (98). After initially increasing barriers to trade in 1985, 
the process of opening up the economy was quickly resumed (142). The average import 
tariff of 33 percent was raised to 40 percent in 1985, and then reduced again in the following 
years to 25 percent-30 percent in 1988-1990 (132,142). Over the 1980s the system of 
restitution of direct taxes that was put in place to compensate exporting firms for the 
negative effects of protectionist measures was slowly reduced until it was suspended in 1990.  
Subsidies and incentives to increase manufacturing export competitiveness were also 
reduced significantly (128).  
While unilateral trade liberalization increased, a more important aspect of trade 
liberalization was Uruguay’s deepening of bilateral trade agreements with Argentina and 
Brazil (98). A close relationship between presidents Alfonsin (Argentina) and Sanguinetti 
(Uruguay) and their respective foreign ministers resulted in a 1985 agreement that gave 
Uruguay duty-free entrance to the Argentine market for up to 5 percent of total Argentine 
production on a wide range of products. Under these agreements Uruguay was also allowed 
to export their products to Brazil after only marginal processing, whereas competitors in 
Argentina and Brazil were not granted the same privileges. This especially advanced chemical 
exportation industry in Uruguay (128). By 1990 total exports to Argentina and Brazil 
accounted for about 42 percent of all exports out of Uruguay (128). 
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4.1.6 Effects of Trade Reform in Uruguay in the 1980s: Bilateral trade boom, trade 
surplus and manufacturing decline  
 Trade in Uruguay over the 1980s resulted in a trade surplus and a contraction in the 
manufacturing sector that resembled trade patterns in Argentina, though bilateral trade with 
Argentina and Brazil played a more significant role in Uruguay. Overall exports doubled (in 
nominal dollar terms) from US $854 million in 1985 to US $1.6 billion in 1989. Imports 
increased at a slower rate, from US $675 million in 1985 to US $1.1 billion in 1989 (143). 
The balance of trade reached a positive US $463 million in 1989, helping offset the demands 
of debt service. While the growth in exports were similar in both Argentina and Uruguay 
much of Uruguay’s increase can be credited to preferential access to the markets of Brazil 
and Argentina rather than to its openness to world markets (128). Bilateral agreements 
existed at a time when the markets of Argentina and Brazil were still protected, and most of 
the products covered by the agreements were not produced domestically in these two 
countries giving Uruguay’s export industries a substantial advantage. The revival of the 
economy in 1986-1987 was based on demand from the sub region, and by 1989-1990 the 
two neighbouring countries absorbed one-third of Uruguay’s exports (144). Of the export 
total of $1.6 billion in 1989, exports to Brazil made up US $443 million and to Argentina US 
$78 million (145). Non-traditional exports also only increased to the markets of Argentina 
and Brazil, not elsewhere (128). Uruguay’s manufacturing industry, however, endured 
similarly negative consequences as Argentina’s under the gradually increasing openness to 
the world, with the exception of specific industries that exported to Argentina and Brazil 
under bilateral agreements. GDP between 1980 and 1990 increased by 5 percent in real 
terms, while manufacturing GDP declined by almost 10 percent indicating the inability of 
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manufacturing to adjust to the opening up of the economy. Exports of manufacturing 
increased but only for a few highly specialized sectors and firms. 
4.1.7 Uruguay’s Trade Reform in the 1990s: Following in Argentina’s footsteps 
 In 1990 the pace of trade liberalization in Uruguay accelerated and became more 
closely integrated with Argentine trade policy. In the first half of the 1990s unilateral trade 
liberalization continued to increase substantially though at a more gradual rate than 
Argentina. By 1993, the highest import tariff in Uruguay was 20 percent (73,144). Along with 
tariff reductions many nontariff barriers and sectoral privileges were removed and export 
subsidies were reduced.  
These unilateral trade policies were accompanied by a series of regional tariff 
reductions as a consequence of the creation of the Mercosur (73). Mercosur was an 
unlooked-for and, initially at least, unwelcome development for Uruguay because it meant 
losing its exclusive preferences to the markets in Brazil and Argentina (144). Uruguay’s entry 
into Mercosur followed the same regulations and process as the other member countries 
with intra-Mercosur tariff reductions to 0 percent by the end of 1994 and external tariff 
reductions scheduled to be between 0 percent and 20 percent by the year 2000. Slight 
differences were negotiated under the exceptions to tariffs with other Mercosur partners, in 
which Uruguay had an extensive list with 953 items in comparison to Argentina’s 223 items. 
These exceptions were eliminated by the year 2000. Uruguay also had 300 exceptions to the 
Common External Tariff similar to Argentina, but these exceptions represented a larger 
proportion of Uruguay’s smaller market, allowing it a slightly slower transition to world 
openness than Argentina. These exceptions were scheduled to converge with CET by the 
year 2001 (129,132,144).  
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Despite the greater proportion of exceptions in the CET, Uruguay’s significantly 
smaller size placed it in a disadvantaged position relative to Argentina and Brazil in the 
regional agreement. (144). The more powerful economic status of Argentina and Brazil 
became reflected in the propensity of these two countries to alter the rules of the agreement 
when it didn’t economically favour them (135,144,146). In 1995, for instance, only a few 
months after the trade agreement was in effect, financial crises in Argentina and Brazil 
prompted the countries to increase the tariffs in the Mercosur agreement and to expand the 
list of their exceptions (146). 
4.1.8 Effects of Trade Reforms in Uruguay in the 1990s: Moderate trade growth, trade 
deficit and manufacturing decline 
 In the 1990s, increased liberalization and regional integration resulted in only modest 
growth in trade in Uruguay in comparison to Argentina’s dramatic growth but, as in 
Argentina, it was accompanied by a debilitated manufacturing sector and an increased trade 
deficit. Both countries’ imports in the 1990s grew at a much faster rate than exports, leading 
to trade deficits (135). Trade with Mercosur countries also grew significantly more than with 
non-Mercosur countries demonstrating that trade in the globalized market for Uruguay, like 
Argentina, was less successful than under the more protected regional agreement (147). 
From 1990 to 1997, exports and imports in Uruguay with Mercosur countries grew 228.15 
percent and 299.44 percent, respectively, while with non-Mercosur countries the 
corresponding figures were 124.75 percent and 261.39 percent (135). Another similarity 
experienced by Argentina and Uruguay was the negative impact of trade liberalization on the 
manufacturing sectors. In Uruguay the share of total economic output in manufacturing 
decreased from 25 percent-27 percent at the beginning of the period to 18 percent in 1997 
(73). 
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Table 4.1: Trade Reforms in the 1980s 
1. Unilateral trade 
 Argentina Uruguay 
Import Tariffs  Reduced from 45 
percent (1987) to 29 
percent (1988) 
 Initially increased 33 
percent-40 percent 
(1985) 
 Reduced after 1985 
to 25 percent-30 
percent (1988 –1990)  
Export Tariffs  Reduced temporarily 




 Data not available 




 Restitution of direct 
taxes to compensate 
firms reduced slowly 
until suspended in 
1990. 
 Subsidies and 




2. Bilateral Trade 
Trade Agreements  24 bilateral trade 
agreements with 
Brazil (1984-1990) 
 Bilateral trade with 




Table 4.2: Effects of Trade Reforms 1980s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
Trade Balance  Trade surplus (US$ 8.3 
billion 1990) 
 Trade surplus (US$ 463 
million 1989) 
 Trade surplus due to 
bilateral trade with Brazil 
and Argentina rather than 
openness to world markets 
Imports  Imports suppressed 
through reduced 
government spending, 
increased taxes and 
reduced credit availability 
 Imports increased slowly 
Exports  Exports expanded sharply  Exports doubled 
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but still below world 
average annual growth 
rate of exports 
 Exports were diversified 
 
Manufacturing  Overall contraction of 
manufacturing sector 
 Smaller firms disappeared, 
larger conglomerates 
expanded 
 Contraction in 
manufacturing overall 
 Manufacturing exports 
declined except for a few 
specialized firms 
 
Table 4.3: Trade Reforms in the 1990s 
1. Unilateral Reform 
 Argentina Uruguay 
Import Tariffs  Nominal import 
tariffs reduced to 13 
percent (1994) 
 Highest tariff 20 
percent in 1993. 
Export Tariffs  Export tariffs 
eliminated after 1990 
 Not available 




 Export promotion 
mechanisms 
introduced (e.g. tax 
rebate raised to 20 
percent) 
 Non-tariff barriers 
and sectoral 
privileges removed 
2. Regional Trade Reform (Mercosur) 
Intra-Mercosur Tariffs  Tariffs reduced to 0 
percent by 1994 
 Tariffs reduced to 0 
percent by 1994 
External Tariffs  Tariffs reduced to 0 
percent-20 percent 
by 2000 





 223 exceptions – 
integrated in 1999 
 953 exceptions – 
ended in 2000 
Common External Tariff 
Exceptions  
 Around 300 
exceptions – ended 
in 2001 
 300 exceptions – 
ended in 2001 
 
Table 4.4: Effects of Trade Reform in the 1990s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
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Trade Balance  Trade deficit  Trade deficit 
Imports 
Mercosur 
 Grew 856.96 percent  Grew 299.44 percent 
Imports Non - 
Mercosur 
 Grew 713.81 percent  Grew 261.39 percent 
Exports 
Mercosur 
 Grew 490.78 percent  Grew 228.15 percent 
Exports Non - 
Mercosur 
 Grew 157 percent  Grew 124.75 percent 
Manufacturing  Reduction in industrial 
exports 
 Small and medium sized 
firms suffered 
 Manufacturing decreased 
from 25 percent-27 percent 
(1994) to 18 percent (1997) 
 
4.2 Privatization 
4.2.1 Privatization in Argentina in the 1990s: Selling off public enterprises 
Privatization was an aspect of neoliberal reforms that wasn’t implemented in 
Argentina until the 1990s due to opposition in the Senate and by provincial governors and 
union leaders (44,137). By the end of the 1980s, hyperinflation and increasing external and 
fiscal debt led to a growing acceptance by the public and political opposition that there was 
no alternative to the drastic reforms proposed by President Menem. In addition, labour was 
co-opted into accepting privatization through tactics such as allocating shares to workers in 
privatized enterprises (148). Given the economic crisis under which Menem became 
president, he was able to pass crucial legislation allowing him to bypass existing 
governmental institutions in order to implement his economic reforms. One of the powers 
he obtained in this economically pressured environment was the Economic Emergency Act, 
which allowed him to dissolve, unite or break up any state owned enterprises.  
Starting in 1990, privatization of the public sector was swift and exhaustive. By 1993 
more than 30 state public enterprises, representing the bulk of the state-owned firms, had 
been sold. The process covered a wide range of producers of goods and services including 
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telephone and communications, airline companies, petrochemicals, petroleum, about 10,000 
km of highways, railways and other transport systems, natural gas distribution, electricity, 
water, iron and steel, coal, a series of firms in defence, hydroelectric dams, television 
channels, hotels, ports, silos and horseracing stadiums (149). The privatizing of traditionally 
public enterprises that had been established over 40 years earlier under Juan Peron 
represented a dramatic rupture from Argentina’s nationalistic past (150). 
4.2.2 Privatization Effects in Argentina in the 1990s: Short-term profits and long-term 
costs 
Privatization over the 1990s had many short-term economic and political benefits for 
Menem’s government(151). As state owned enterprises were often subsidized selling public 
enterprises allowed the government to reduce the ongoing economic burden of these 
enterprises on the government’s yearly budget. More crucially, privatization provided 
substantial cash revenues that reduced the fiscal deficit and contributed to decreasing the 
public debt through debt–equity swap schemes that avoided resorting to inflationary 
financing. By late 1993 privatization had earned more than $15 billion dollars for the 
government from which about $5.8 billion went towards the domestic and foreign public 
debt (149).   
On a political front, privatization also met the important goal of appeasing 
multilateral lending institutions who were advocating for Argentina to implement more 
radical reforms (59). By 1989, the IMF had suspended disbursements on its loans and 
privatization became a condition of the standby agreement18 (152). In particular, the 
exchanges (‘swaps’) of foreign debt held by the public sector for equity in the privatization 
                                                 
18 Standby agreements are IMF financing up to a specified amount to overcome short-term 
or cyclical balance of payments difficulties. 
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of Entel and Aerolineas were key transactions that enabled Argentina to join the Brady 
Plan19 (149-151). Privatization also met the political goal of regaining support for the 
Argentine government from the business community. Up to 1991 Menem’s application of a 
variety of policy measures had failed to control hyperinflation and privatization became a 
way of restoring the credibility of the administration by living up to the promises it had 
made in its election campaign.  
While the short-term advantages of privatization had immediate economic and 
political benefits for the Menem administration, an examination of the long-term 
repercussions provides a bleaker picture. Privatization in Argentina was implemented under 
a shock-therapy approach to economic policy intended to minimize public resistance (150). 
As a result of the tight deadlines under which privatization occurred and in order to obtain 
high sale prices economic issues such as developing a pricing policy for privatized firms, or 
the establishment of regulatory frameworks and boards that are typically integral to 
privatization programs in high income countries were often forgone. In order to make public 
assets more attractive to private purchasers, high real rates, as well as quasi-monopolistic 
conditions, were also often negotiated, negating the potential competitive advantage argued 
to be a benefit of the privatization process (151,153). While services increased in some areas, 
the consequence of the rapid privatization process and the temporary influx of cash from 
the sales of public firms generally have been high profit rates for private owners and 
substantial increases in costs to the consumers (148,153). The sale, for example, of Entel, 
Argentina’s state-owned telecommunications firm, to two new private monopolies, Telecom 
in the North and Telefonica in the South, resulted in price increases of over 95 percent 
                                                 
19 The Brady Plan was a program that provided developing nations a way to restructure their 
sovereign debt obligations to foreign commercial banks. 
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(150). Privatization in Argentina was also undertaken in vital areas in which it would seem 
logical to have the public sector involved, and in cases where the sector was economically 
self-sustaining or profitable (148). The water sector, for example, was a public sector utility 
that was privatized despite the fact that it was not deficit-ridden and had actually produced a 
surplus in 1992.  
Politically, privatization was also used to increase the concentration of economic 
power in the hands of the economic establishment and their political allies calling into 
question the ability of normal democratic procedures to remain uncorrupted (153,154). 
Intense political ties between Telecom and Telefonica and the Menem administration, for 
instance, led to a lack of Congressional consultation and public disclosure during the sale of 
the state owned firm Entel, and resulted in a 1993 presidential decree concerning the 
regulatory board Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CNT) that rendered it nearly 
powerless over the private companies (150). The hurried and pressured environment under 
which privatizations took place led to a situation in which state monopolies critiqued for 
their inefficiency have been exchanged for rent-seeking, privately owned oligopolies and 
monopolies.   
4.2.3 Privatization in Uruguay in the 1990s: Preserving public provision  
Privatization in Uruguay, as in Argentina, did not begin until the 1990s and even 
then was tempered by public and political resistance (144). The return to democracy in 1985 
in Uruguay brought with it public pressure to restore a traditional political culture that 
supported public provision of public services. It was not until the election of President 
Lacalle in 1989 that a privatization agenda began to be seriously attempted. Faced with the 
problem of fiscal imbalance and high inflation, Lacalle in 1991 secured the passage of a 
privatization law authorizing the policy in general terms and setting out specific terms for 
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particular public–sector corporations.  However, a referendum was immediately announced 
that resulted in a victory for the Left by 72 percent to 28 percent and led to the overturning 
of certain parts of the law. Privatization was not stopped entirely as the operation of the port 
of Montevideo and the Gas Company were turned over to the private sector, the State 
Insurance Bank lost its motor-vehicle insurance monopoly in 1994 and a number of in-
house services in public-sector operations were contracted-out. The actual sales of public 
sector assets, though, were minimized to the airline Pluna, the fishing enterprise Industria 
Lobera y Pesquera del Estado (ILPE) and the sugar-cane operation El Esinillar(144). Despite 
the financial crisis facing Uruguay, voters, unions and the leftist political parties continued 
pushing an agenda of social protection over that of fiscal restraint. 
In 1995, the newly elected president Sanguinetti (1995-2000) furthered privatization 
in his reform program Bases for a Dialogue in Search of a National Government; though 
once again its reforms remained less extreme than in Argentina (144). Bases accepted the 
principle of privatization subject to certain conditions. This privatization program was 
characterized by the concession to the private sector of ancillary activities, joint ventures 
between private and public enterprise and removal of monopoly powers from public 
corporations. Unlike Argentina the rationale of the program was to increase the level of 
competition within the public sector, rather than to secure the one time revenue benefit of a 
sale. In contrast to privatization in Argentina, the Bases document in Uruguay was also 
strategic in avoiding privatizing natural monopolies (such as water) and enterprises that were 
profitable. This conditional approach to privatization aided in maintaining Uruguay’s 
democratic integrity by restricting the privatization of enterprises that would enable a 
concentration of economic and as a result political power to accumulate in the hands of the 
economic elite (144,153).  
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Uruguay’s more moderate privatization process has not been without its own 
complications such as the contradictory role of regulator and competitor that public 
corporations now play. The process of privatization has also been critiqued for not reducing 
rates or requiring an improvement in the quality of service (144).  In general, though, 
Uruguay’s chosen route to privatization has been restrained by the decision to preserve 
public provision, which has shielded the country from the extreme socio-economic and 
political repercussions faced by Argentina.   
 
Table 4.5: Privatization Reforms in the 1990s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
 
Year Reforms Were 
Implemented 
 Started in 1990 and 
was quick and 
exhaustive (largely 
completed by 1993) 
 Started in 1994 with 
a slow and gradual 
implementation 
Rationale of Reforms  Obtain maximum 
profits 
 Increased 
competition in the 
public sector rather 
than selling public 
enterprises 
Extensiveness of  
Reforms 
 30 state owned 
enterprises 
representing the bulk 
of state owned firms 
privatized by 1993 
 Privatization of 
profitable sectors 





 High real rates and 
quasi monopolistic 
conditions negotiated 
 Concession to the 
private sector of 
ancillary activities 
 Joint ventures 
between private and 
public enterprises 




 Limited sales 
occurred avoiding 
privatizing 
enterprises that were 
natural monopolies 




Table 4.6: Effects of Privatization in the 1990s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
 
Consumer Services and 
Costs 
 High profit rates for 
private owners 
achieved at the 
expense of 
substantially 
increased costs to the 
consumer for public 
services 
 Rates and services 




 Substantial cash 
revenues that 
reduced fiscal deficit 
and decreased public 
debt 
 Minor cash revenue 
Long-term Economic 
Effects 








Political Effects  Appeased multilateral 
lending agencies to 
allow loans to be 
disbursed and the 
Brady Plan to be 
joined 










4.3 Labour Market Reforms 
4.3.1 Argentina’s Labour Market Reforms in The 1980s: Wage suppression, restricting 
workers rights, delaying collective bargaining and the erosion of unions 
 
During the 1980s in Argentina, two contradictory trends emerged in labour relations 
arising from the restoration of democracy in 1983. Under the preceding military regime 
(1976 – 1983), the role of the state had dramatically shifted from intervening to protect 
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workers to regulating labour in a manner consistent with the needs of the market (72). In 
1983, as a result of the debt crisis and economic restructuring under SAPs, the newly elected 
democratic government continued to implement market-driven labour policies rather than 
returning to its historical protectionist role.  Labour policy in this economically turbulent 
time became centered on wage suppression that was intended to control inflation by 
reducing domestic consumption, cutting down imports and expanding exports (72). In 1985 
the government implemented a new stabilization program (Plan Austral) that included 
freezing both wages and prices. Consistent with the government’s new market oriented 
approach, restrictions on workers rights (e.g. relaxing limitations on collective dismissal) 
introduced by the military in 1976 were also continued, allowing firms to more easily adjust 
their labour force be more responsive to changes in their economic productivity (72).  
 A determining factor allowing government wage control and relaxed employment 
protection over the 1980s was the diminished capacity and authority of unions. For unions 
the return to democracy meant a return of freedom of action and political expression but 
also a loss of political power and influence.  By 1983 the capacity of labour had been severely 
limited due to unemployment stemming from deindustrialization and the shift in power 
from social and labour ministries to ministries dealing with the economy. Under the civilian 
governments over the 1980s, the re-enactment of collective bargaining was repeatedly 
delayed and agreements were not officially recognized until March 1988. The restrictions on 
collective bargaining, suppression of wages, and reduction of worker’s rights were resisted by 
the labour movement with 13 general strikes called during Alfonsin’s presidency (1983 – 
1989) but only minor concessions on wages and a slow lifting of restrictions on negotiations 
were achieved(127,155). 
 70
4.3.2 Labour Market Effects in Argentina in the 1980s: Decline in employment and 
income 
Employment and income in the 1980s changed significantly under the effects of 
neoliberal economic reforms. The reforms resulted in a drastic decline in income and 
employment conditions that were especially severe in the second stabilization phase of 1987-
90 (116). Per capita income fell by 26 percent over the decade. Overall, the decline was so 
severe that only countries in the midst of a revolution or civil war, such as El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Peru, did as poorly (116). A key aspect responsible for the decline in income 
was real (inflation-adjusted) wages. From 1980 – 1989 Argentina experienced a 50 percent 
reduction in real wages. The worst period of the 1980s was the recession of 1988-89 in 
which real wages in the manufacturing sector were cut in half. The trends in unemployment 
show a similar pattern. Although unemployment figures in the 1980s remained relatively low, 
the rate increased over the decade to reach three times its historic record of 2 percent-3 
percent by the late 1980s (127,156) . A further revealing characteristic of the period was the 
growth of informal labour and underemployment.  There was virtually no job growth in the 
salaried or formal sector through 1987 and 82 percent of the increase in employment 
occurred in the self-employed (or informal) sector (116). Underutilization of the workforce, 
which had been relatively low in Argentina by developing country standards, showed an 
equally alarming pattern. In greater Buenos Aires, for example, the visible underemployment 
rate rose from 5.2 percent in 1980 to 9 percent in 1990 (116,127). Overall, the 1980s in 
Argentina was a disastrous decade characterized by significantly deteriorated income and 
employment conditions (97,127) 
4.3.3 Argentina’s Labour Market Reforms in the 1990s: Deregulating labour, 
decentralizing collective bargaining and diminishing union strength 
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 The end of the 1980s brought about worsening macroeconomic conditions in the 
country that provided incentive for accelerating structural reforms in the 1990s. Labour 
policy reforms in Argentina continued the market oriented approach of the 1980s by further 
decreasing employment protection, reducing labour costs and weakening the role of unions 
in collective bargaining (41,69). The economic pressures leading the government to restrict 
collective bargaining and repress wages in the 1980s now focused on reducing protective 
labour legislation (governing wages and employment conditions) and decentralizing 
collective bargaining. Key examples of deregulation occurred in 1991 and 1995 in which the 
national labour law was altered to promote atypical or precarious forms of employment 
contract and reduced wage and non-wage labour costs. Under these reforms, employers were 
exempted from payroll taxes for social security and unemployment insurance, the ceilings on 
compensation for unjustified layoffs were lowered, salary increases were linked to 
productivity and regulations on the termination of employment and mobility within the firm 
for short-term contracts and employment were eased.  
Key factors enabling neoliberal labour policies to be implemented over the 1990s 
were the aggressive strategies used by the Menem government (1989-1995) to undermine the 
status of labour associations and the role of unions in collective bargaining (41). 
Government policy after 1991 focused on decentralizing collective bargaining and dividing 
and weakening labour unions. Legislation was modified to encourage small firm negotiation 
rather than industry wide agreements to allow for increased inequality in wages that would 
better reflect the productivity of individual firms. Barriers to the existence of more than one 
national labour confederation were also removed and the role of union leadership in 
negotiations was reduced. Unions were also financially weakened by a new law that ended 
the compulsory contribution by workers to the unions’ obra (national union) social funds.  
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Opposition to Menem’s anti-labour policies was also sidestepped through forceful political 
maneuvers. Right-to-strike restrictions, for instance, that found no support in Congress, 
were implemented by administrative decree. The cumulative effect of these reforms over the 
1990s was a substantially fragmented and deregulated collective bargaining system with a 
significantly weakened and decentralized union structure.  
4.3.4 Labour Market Effects in Argentina in the 1990s: Unemployment, precarious 
employment, underemployment and wages 
In the 1990s, the acceleration of neoliberal reforms led to renewed economic stability 
and growth but did not generate the anticipated improvements in employment and income 
(139). While the economy grew rapidly between 1991 and 1994, unemployment increased 
from 6 percent to over 12 percent (43,139). Part of the explanation for this phenomenon 
was the low generation of jobs and the increased number of people looking for work. 
Privatization of state firms and the acceleration of trade liberalization resulted in the 
reduction of state employment and the contraction of employment in manufacturing. Rising 
unemployment was also related to the growing number of people seeking employment due 
to increasing incidence of unemployment in heads of the household that forced other 
members of the family and especially women to increase their participation in the labour 
market (139).  
From 1991-1995, women’s labour force participation rates grew sharply from 38 
percent to 46 percent and from 1985 to 2000 it rose by almost 40 percent (157). With the 
coming of the recession of 1995/1996 unemployment increased sharply jumping from 10.1 
percent in October 1994 to 18.4 percent in 1995 (156,158). While some of this increase may 
have been connected to the recession, a greater part of the growth in unemployment was 
structural, resulting from contraction in the manufacturing sector as it continued to adapt to 
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trade liberalization, i.e. a loss in traditional male employment (130,139,156). From 1996 to 
1998 unemployment rates dropped, reaching 12.4 percent in October 1998, but never 
achieved pre-recession levels (155,156). Another factor discrediting this apparent recovery 
was that a sizeable proportion of the jobs created during this period were also due to the 
implementation of special employment programs, which were characterized by very low 
wages and low productivity, and were only offered on a temporary basis. These programs 
were responsible for 80 percent of new employment in the public sector (155).  With the 
recession of mid-1998 Argentina’s labour markets eroded further and unemployment 
reached 14.7 percent in 2000. 
 Unemployment in the 1990s was accompanied by a steady increase in precarious 
employment, underemployment and reduced wages. In the area of Metropolitan Buenos 
Aires the number of jobs in the informal sector represented 26.7 percent out of total salaried 
employment in 1990, 36 percent in 1998 and by the year 2000 it had reached 40 percent. As 
many as two-thirds of the jobs lost during the period resulted from reductions in 
employment in the manufacturing sector; as the industrial sector continued to represent only 
17 percent of GDP in 1998. The quality of employment in Argentina also deteriorated due 
to the growth of temporary employment. Nearly half of the private-sector employment 
growth in metropolitan Buenos Aires, for example, can be explained by the expansion of 
limited-term positions. Underemployment also continued to be a reality in the 1990s 
growing from 7.9 percent in 1991 to 11.3 percent in 1995 (130,157).  
In addition, real wages continued to suffer over the 1990s. Despite an initial recovery 
from 1991 to 1993 and wage stabilization in 1994, from 1995 onwards real wages continued 
to fall. Even at their peak, real wages stayed below the levels of the previous decades 
(139,159). The 1990s thus were characterized by increasing unemployment, decreasing 
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wages, and job instability associated with the increased implementation of structural 
adjustment policies since 1991 (157). 
4.3.5 Labour Market Reforms in Uruguay in the 1980s: Restoring collective 
bargaining and wages  
 Uruguay, like Argentina, faced economic conditions of debt and rising inflation in 
the 1980s. Economic reforms in Uruguay, however, were tempered by political and union 
pressure to address public social and health concerns that had eroded under the military 
government(160). A key difference in the development of labour policy over the 1980s was 
that, unlike the gradual return of collective bargaining in Argentina, Uruguay’s unique system 
of Wage Councils banned under the previous military government was reinstated in 1985 
with the return to democracy. The newly elected government also initially committed to 
promote a recovery of real wages, which had been decimated under the military; and to 
reinstate all public-sector employees who had been dismissed by the military regime for their 
union activity. Toward the end of the 1980s, the government’s initial commitments to wage 
recovery were constrained by increasing indebtedness and the need to control inflation. 
Addressing economic concerns through wage restrictions in Uruguay, however, was never as 
drastic as in Argentina, partly due to strong resistance by trade unions. Attempts to reduce 
wage increases to 90 percent of inflation in 1988, for example, were met by labour protests, 
which also effectively prevented imposition of a tougher regime of wage adjustments in 1989 
(144).  Thus, while the general approach to labour market reform under democratic 
government in the 1980s paralleled Argentina’s, Uruguay’s reforms were more gradual and 
less intense, largely due to political and trade union opposition (147).  
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4.3.6 Effects of Labour Market Reforms in Uruguay in the 1980s: Income and 
employment recovery 
In contrast to Argentina whose employment conditions worsened over the 1980s, 
Uruguay entered the 1980s with high levels of unemployment and low real wages but moved 
towards improved salaries and reduced unemployment after the transition to democratic 
government in 1985. Real wages in Uruguay over the second half of the 1980s recovered 
some of the loss they had undergone under the military dictatorship. With the restoration of 
democratic government in 1985, real wages were raised an average of 15 percent over the 
previous year. Over the rest of the decade wages were increased slowly though they never 
regained their 1968 levels (145).   
The pattern of unemployment in Uruguay over the 1980s also differed from that of 
Argentina. While in Argentina the unemployment rate started low at the beginning of the 
decade and increased toward its end, in Uruguay unemployment started high at 13.9 percent 
in 1980-1981 in Montevideo, fell to 9.3 percent in 1987 and then held steady at around 9 
percent until 1990 (116,127,144,147). A key factor explaining the difference between the two 
countries was the condition of the manufacturing sector. In Uruguay employment in 
manufacturing grew until 1989 while in Argentina manufacturing employment suffered a 
considerable decline over the 1980s (147,161). 
4.3.7 Labour Market Reforms in Uruguay in the 1990s: Gradual decentralization and 
weakening union support 
 Like Argentina, Uruguay experienced worsening economic conditions in the 1990s 
with increasing external pressure to implement structural reforms. In response to the eroding 
economic conditions Uruguay adopted market driven labour policies but, in contrast to 
Argentina’s sharper reform process, implementation was gradual. Uruguay historically had 
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not legislated union and workers’ rights, although union activities were virtually unchecked 
and union rights had been guaranteed by custom and usage for decades, except during the 
military dictatorship (98). Government efforts to marketize labour thus concentrated on 
decentralizing wage setting institutions, primarily by withdrawing itself from the trilateral 
Wage Councils in 1992 to encourage decentralized bipartite (employer/employees) 
negotiation (72,147). After 1992, membership in unions and union dues also became 
voluntary significantly reducing membership in the private sector (147). Overall in the 1990s 
the reforms to collective bargaining and union associations adopted in Uruguay followed 
Argentina’s stand of increasing marketization, but the less aggressive steps taken to expand 
decentralized negotiation and weaken union strength led to a slower and less severe 
transition than in Argentina.  
4.3.8 Effects of Labour Market Reforms in Uruguay in the 1990s: Declining income 
and employment conditions 
During the 1990s the condition of employment and wages in Uruguay began to more 
closely reflect Argentina’s situation, as neoliberal economic reforms in the two countries 
became more aligned. As in Argentina, economic growth in the 1990s in Uruguay did not 
bring about the expected improvements in labour conditions, though Uruguay fared 
somewhat better. Between 1989 and 1993 there was a modest upward movement of the 
urban unemployment rate followed by a sharp rise persisting for three years to mid-1997 
(144). Unemployment increased to 11 percent in 1995 and 12 percent in 1996-1997 
(147,161). The growth in unemployment over the decade was partly due to the adaptation of 
the manufacturing industry to liberalization, which caused the loss of over 12,000 jobs 
between 1994 and 1997 as a result of closures and increasing productivity (144). Public 
sector cuts also help to explain a significant portion of the jobs lost as on average 6,000 
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public-sector posts were eliminated annually after 1993 (144). Like Argentina, Uruguay’s 
unemployment rate was also affected by greater labour force participation and especially the 
growing participation of women over the 1990s who sought employment in order to 
supplement dwindling household incomes (144,162). Following 1997 Uruguay continued to 
experience increasing unemployment rates that jumped to 13.8 percent in 2000 following the 
shocks from East Asia, Russia, and Brazil in 1998 (130,162,163). 
Over the 1990s the pattern in real wages, underemployment and precarious 
employment followed a trend similar to unemployment. While wages and income 
demonstrated an improvement during the early part of the 1990s from 1995 onwards they 
fell (144). Real wages dropped 4.8 percent in 1995 and an additional 3.2 percent in 1996 
(144). The explanation for increasing wages in the early part of the decade was due in part to 
the significant increase in pensions that took place as a result of the 1989 referendum rather 
than the growing value of salaries (144). As with real wages, underemployment and 
precarious employment drastically worsened after 1994. In Montevideo, precarious 
employment went from 13.7 percent of total employment in 1994 to 16.7 percent in 1998. In 
looking at the characteristics of the labour market over the 1990s it becomes evident that 
despite the high annual average growth rates the acceleration of neoliberal economic reforms 
has had significantly negative impacts on working conditions in Uruguay. 
Table 4.7: Labour Market Reforms in the 1980s 
 
 Argentina Uruguay 
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Wages  Wages frozen in 
1985 with small 
concessions in wages 
over the decade 
 Initial recovery in 
wages in 1985 
 Only minor 
restrictions in wages 
due to union 
opposition 
Collective Bargaining  Re-enactment of 
collective bargaining 
delayed until 1988 
 Wage councils 
reinstated in 1985 
 Public sector 
employees dismissed 
under military for 
union activity 
reinstated 





 N/A (workers rights 
were not legislated in 
Uruguay) 
 
Table 4.8: Labour Market Reforms in the 1990s 
 Argentina  Uruguay 
 
Wages   Salary increases were linked 
to productivity 
 Not available 
Collective 
Bargaining 
 Decentralized collective 
bargaining – legislation 
modified to encourage small 
firm negotiation over 
industry wide agreements 
 More than one national 
union allowed to exist 
 Role of union leadership in 
negotiation reduced 
 Compulsory contributions 
to unions ended 
 Membership in unions and 
union dues were made 
voluntary 
 Encouraged decentralized 
wage setting institutions by 
the government withdrawing 
from Wage councils in 1992 
Workers 
Rights 
 Regulations on the 
termination of employment 
and mobility within the firm 
for short-term contracts and 
employment were eased 
 Employers exempted from 
payroll taxes for social 
security, unemployment 
insurance 
 Compensation for 
unjustified layoffs reduced 
 Not Applicable (workers 
rights not legislated in 
Uruguay) 
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Table 4.9: Effects of Labour Market Reforms in the 1980s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
Per capita income  Decreased  Not available 
Real wages  Decreased  Increased  
Unemployment  Started low with an 
increasing trend 
 Started high with a 
decreasing trend 
Precarious employment  Increased  Not available 
Underemployment  Increased  Not available 
 
Table 4.10: Effects of Labour Market Reforms in the 1990s 
Effects of Labour Market Reforms 1990s 
 Argentina Uruguay 
Unemployment  Increased  Increased 
Precarious Employment  Increased  Increased after 1994 
Underemployment  Increased  Increased after 1994 
Real Wages  Initial recovery  
 Decreased (1995 – 
2000)  
 Initial recovery 





4.4.1 Pension Reforms and Effects in Argentina in the 1980s: Growing financial 
imbalances 
In Argentina the growing financial burden of the pension system became a key social 
policy issue in the 1980s and 1990s. A pension system was first introduced in the early 1900s 
in Argentina financed primarily with payroll taxes; later the system adopted a defined-benefit 
scheme20 funded on a pay-as-you-go basis (77,80,164). Argentina provided widespread 
pension coverage and generous benefits in comparison to most other Latin American 
countries, but was critiqued because it allowed privileged groups within the system and 
because it required increasing public investment (24,77,165). Many factors contributed to the 
increasing costs of the system, including: an aging population (number of contributors to 
pensioners 1.62 to 1); lax entitlement conditions; a short period of wage averaging to 
determine benefits; easy access to disability benefits; high replacement rates (70 – 82 percent 
of wage received in pension); and high payroll taxes that promoted underreporting of 
income and evasion (77,166). 
The government responded to emerging financial imbalances in the 1980s by 
diverting more tax revenues to the system and cutting back on benefits by reducing the 
adjustment for inflation (77). Real pensions actually declined by one half in 1981-1991, but 
successful judicial claims forced the government to retroactively pay pensioners the 
difference between the pension legally set and that actually paid (24). In 1991 the state 
settled the debt to pensioners at $7 billion (24). Despite the retroactive payment of pensions 
in the 1990s, the financial crisis and fiscal austerity measures of the 1980s resulted in serious 
                                                 
20 Defined benefit scheme means benefits are set at a certain level determined by the scheme 
rules and aside from compulsory employee contribution all costs of meeting the quoted 
benefits are the responsibility of the employer 
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reductions to the funding of pensions over the 1980s, increasing the financial burden for a 
large segment of the Argentine population. 
4.4.2 Pension Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: Pension privatization (mixed model) 
During the 1990s Menem’s government inherited a country with severe inflation 
problems and a growing fiscal deficit that was being further threatened by increased 
spending on public pension programs. Social security program spending equalled 13 percent 
of GDP in 1991 of which 80 percent was in pensions (24). Coinciding with these financial 
pressures, the World Bank as a part of their larger SAP offered support to pension 
privatization by providing financial and technical assistance in reforming the pension system 
(81,156). The IMF also included pension privatization plans in the lending agreements that it 
signed with Argentina (83). In the context of these economic and political pressures a new 
system was put into operation in 1994. The new system offered two tiers: a basic pension 
and a choice between a public pay-as-you-go pension and a personal retirement accounts 
program (166). 
With the goal of slowly replacing the old financially strained pay-as-you-go system 
with a new partially funded pension system workers who chose the pay-as-you-go system 
were allowed to switch to the private accounts system at any time, but they could not return 
to the pay-as-you-go system once they had chosen private accounts (166). Workers who did 
not choose between the alternatives were also put into the personal accounts system by 
default (166). In the new scheme, while the basic pension would remain a public pay-as-you-
go system, membership in the complementary pension would ideally gradually transition to 
the private fully funded account system (166).  
The new system aimed to decrease its public financial burden by shifting part of the 
risk of future increases in costs from the state to individuals (167). The old pay-as-you-go 
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system had operated under a defined-benefit scheme that meant that the employer would 
underwrite the vast majority of costs; if investment returns were poor or costs increased the 
employer needed to either make adjustments to the scheme, or to increase the levels of 
contribution (24,164). The new system of private accounts had a defined-contribution 
scheme in which contributions were paid at a fixed level; the member had to shoulder the 
risk and increase the contribution rates when investment returns were poor or costs 
increased (24,164).  
In addition to the structural changes the system’s parameters21 were also altered to 
reduce costs. The employee’s contribution rate rose from 10 percent to 11 percent, the 
minimum retirement age was raised by five years from 55 to 60 for women and 60 to 65 for 
men, the number of years of contributions required to obtain retirement benefits were 
increased from 20 to 30 years, and the expected replacement rate reduced from 70 to 82 
percent of the average of the previous three years of wages to an average of approximately 
60 to 82 percent of the average of the previous ten years of wages (167).  A few groups 
remained exempt from the system: employees of the armed forces and of state and local 
governments and certain professionals with independent retirement systems (82).  
4.4.3 Effects of Pension Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: Economic and social 
deterioration  
A key effect of Menem’s pension reform was increased fiscal spending by the 
government (167,168). The total fiscal impact (that is, cost to the national government) of 
the reform was an increase from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2001 
which clearly played a role in the Argentine government defaulting in 1995, 1997 and 2000 
on parts of the pension rights owed to workers and retirees (79,82,165). Anticipated 
                                                 
21 Parameters are the investment ratios, and criteria for receiving benefits.   
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reductions in administrative costs were not achieved with the reform and payroll 
contributions fell rather than improved (167-169). Stricter conditions for receiving benefits 
did result in fiscal savings; but transition costs, the reduction in employers’ contributions, the 
redirecting of contributions to the private funds and the absorption of 11 pension schemes 
for public employees from the provinces resulted in drastic overall increases in fiscal 
spending (165). In December 2001, in the face of economic collapse, the government seized 
$3.1 billion in pension fund deposits and converted them into treasury bills that devastated 
the finances of the reformed pension fund (79).  
In addition to the system’s economic problems, social protection and equity were 
further deteriorated by the pension reform. Coverage of workers fell from 1994 onwards 
mainly due to the erosion of conditions in the labour market combined with the stricter 
conditions for the acquisition of benefits (outlined above) (165). Increasing unemployment, 
employment policies that permitted the recruitment of new workers free of the obligation to 
pay social security contributions and increases in informal employment all contributed to 
decreased coverage (165,167). In 1993 the percentage of people older than 65 who had no 
pensions of their own or through their spouses was 12.5 percent, increasing to 22.7 percent 
in 2001 (165,167). Coverage rates in Argentina based on affiliates22 fell in Argentina from 70 
percent – 80 percent before the reform to 66 percent after the reform (168). This figure also 
overestimated coverage as only 29 percent of affiliates actively contributed to pensions in 
1998 (167,168).  
                                                 
22 Affiliates are the number of people registered with pension plans; the number of affiliates 
may not reflect the actual pension contributors due to noncompliance, double counting, 
temporary workers who only make payroll contributions occasionally or have permanently 
left the labour force and high unemployment rates.  
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The fully funded component in the mixed scheme also has been found to increase 
gender inequalities and to most negatively affect low income workers. Due to the calculation 
of life expectancy factors those who lived longer (women) obtained on average 10.5 percent 
lower benefits than those whose life expectancies were shorter (men) (77). The workers most 
affected by reduced coverage were also the least skilled exacerbating the inequalities in work 
income (165). Reforms to the pension system in Argentina in the 1990s thus encountered 
ongoing economic problems and led to worsened coverage and increased inequities (166). 
4.4.4 Pension Reform in Uruguay in the 1980s: Growing financial imbalances  
 Uruguay, like Argentina, has one of the oldest and most indebted pension systems in 
Latin America that by the 1970s had developed to be more generous and to cover more 
people than in most other Latin American countries (170). By the 1980s a combination of 
high retirement benefits, reduced payroll revenues, widespread coverage, early retirement 
and an aging population all contributed to the growing pension deficit (24). In 1982 the 
pension deficit was 6 percent of GDP and reached 10 percent of GDP by the mid 1980s, 
making it the most debt-ridden system in Latin America (171). 
Despite the growing costs of pensions, the election of a democratic government in 
1985 brought efforts to restore some of their real value. Between 1984 and 1987 pensions 
grew 20 percent in real terms (143,171). After 1987 though, the government began to take 
measures to try and reduce pension costs. In 1987 a new law tightened some of the liberal 
conditions of the privileged regimes by setting a ceiling on maximum pensions, but failed to 
raise the retirement age from 55/60 (women/men) to 60/65. Two years later a constitutional 
amendment repealed the ceiling on pensions and required that all pensions be linked to the 
cost of living. This measure required significant increases in taxation. Overall, Uruguay, like 
Argentina attempted only minor reforms to the pension system over the 1980s but had 
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greater success than Argentina in restoring some of the real value of pensions. Entitlement 
conditions remained very generous, and the liberal coverage and benefits it offered 
continued to raise the pension deficit (24,170). 
4.4.5 Pension Reform in Uruguay in the 1990s: Pension privatization (mixed model) 
 In the 1990s a similar pension reform as in Argentina was initiated in Uruguay but 
political resistance delayed its implementation until the late 1990s. Attempts to reform the 
pension program (with a mixed type) failed in 1992 but were eventually passed in 1995 and 
implemented in 1997 (24,172). As in Argentina, growing deficits in the pension system, 
political pressure by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank and 
encouragement from both in the form of transition loans played a key role in achieving the 
pension reform (76,81).  
Uruguay introduced a pension system similar to Argentina’s, replacing the public 
pay-as-you-go system with a two tier system, combining a compulsory reformed public pay-
as-you-go program that provided a basic pension with a supplementary fully funded program 
with individual accounts (24). All members of the system who were under 40 years of age 
and any future entrants of the labour force were obligatorily covered by the new system (24). 
Unlike Argentina’s defined contribution scheme Uruguay has a defined benefit scheme that 
was adjusted for inflation, meaning that if investment returns were poor or costs increased 
the employer, and not the employee, needed to either make adjustments to the scheme, or to 
increase levels of contribution (24,164).  
In addition to structural changes, Uruguay, like Argentina underwent some 
parametric reforms. The retirement age was set at 60 for both sexes (female age of 
retirement increases gradually from 55 to 60) with 35 years of work/contributions required 
(24) and the employer’s contribution was reduced by 2 percent while employee contributions 
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rose 2 percent (24,144,170). In exchange for the payroll tax cut, employers are required to 
raise employee pay so their take-home earnings after social security taxes will remain the 
same as before (170). Uruguay’s reforms, like Argentina’s failed to alter pensions of 
privileged professions including university professionals, bank employees and notaries; and 
left the generous military and police pension funds unchanged by the reform (82,173). 
4.4.6 The Effects of Pension Reform in Uruguay: Economic and social deterioration 
Drawing comparisons between the effects of reform on Argentina and Uruguay is 
difficult because of the differences in data collection and the recent timing of the reforms; 
but early evaluations indicate that Uruguay, like Argentina, is experiencing ongoing financial 
problems and also an increased risk to social integration. The fiscal effects of reforms were 
estimated to have remained high at around 2 percent of GDP in 2001, a level similar to that 
of Argentina’s (84). A part of reason for continuing fiscal problems were reduced 
compliance to payroll contributions and high administration costs. While data on compliance 
before the reform was not available it was estimated to have fallen to 59 percent in 1999 and 
administrative costs remained high at 2.68 percent of taxable income in 1999-2000 (168,169). 
 While little data on the social repercussions of the reform were available, initial 
evidence demonstrated that social protection was not improved and may have worsened 
following the reform though its later implementation delayed these negative effects. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the real value of pensions in Uruguay increased dramatically with the 
constitutional amendment in 1989 falling later in the decade (24,172). Coverage rates in 
Uruguay remained unchanged by the reform continuing at around 72 percent of affiliates by 
the end of 1998 (84,168). However, of these affiliates coverage rates of active contributors in 
1998 dropped slightly in Uruguay to 66 percent. While implemented at a later date, pension 
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reform in Uruguay adopted a similar system to Argentina that resulted in continuing 
financial problems and endangered social protection.   
Table 4.11: Pension Reform and Effects in the 1980s 
Reforms  Effects 
Argentina  Uruguay Argentina Uruguay 
Real value  
 Declined 
1981-1991 














 Efforts made to 
increase real value 
of pensions with 
return to 
democracy 
 Ceiling on 
pensions 
implemented in 








Table 4.12: Pension Reform in the 1990s (Mixed Model) 
1. Structural Reform Argentina Uruguay 
Financial Regime Public – Pay-as-you-go & 
Private – Full individual 
funding  
Public – Pay-as-you-go & 
Private – Full individual 
funding 
Year Implemented 1994 1996 
Contribution  Public – Non-defined 
Private – Defined 
Public – Non-defined 
Private – Non-defined  
Benefit Public – Defined 
Private – Non-defined 
Public – Defined 
Private – Non-defined 
Present Members  May change from public to 
mixed but not return 
Grouped by age; under 40 to 
join mixed and older allowed 
to choose 
Future Members May choose between public 
and mixed 
Must join mixed 
Privileged Pension 
Schemes (certain 
professionals, civil servants, 
military and police) 
Unaltered Unaltered 
2.Parametric Reform Argentina Uruguay 
Retirement Age Increased 
Men – 65, Women – 60  
Increased 






Increased to  
35 years 
Employees Contribution Increased 1 percent Increased 2 percent 
Employers Contribution Unchanged Decreased 2 percent 
Replacement Rate Decreased to 60 percent - 82 
percent of the average of the 




Table 4.13: Effects of Pension Reform in the 1990s 
1. Economic Argentina  Uruguay 
Fiscal Costs Increased to 2.7 percent 
GDP (2001) 
Unimproved around 2 
percent GDP (2001) 
Administrative Costs Unimproved 3.41 percent 
taxable income (1999-2000) 
Unimproved 2.68 percent 
taxable income (1999-2000) 
Payroll Compliance Decreased – active affiliates 
44 percent (1999) 
Decreased - active affiliates 
59 percent (1999) 
2. Social Argentina Uruguay 
Coverage Decreased 
affiliates 66 percent (1998) 
active contributors 29 
percent (1998) 
Unimproved  
affiliates 72 percent (1998) 
active contributors 66 
percent (1998) 




Women/Men Women receive 10.5 percent 
lower benefits than men 
Not Available 
 
4.5 Health Care Systems 
4.5.1 Health System Structure in Argentina 
Argentina’s health care system is made up of three main financiers and 
administrators: public health care, social insurance organizations (Obra Sociales) and private 
institutions operating on a for profit and not for profit basis (174,175). The social insurance 
system was made up of a large number of separate funds that were supported by mandatory 
taxes paid by every active worker. Given the fragmentation of the social insurance sector, 
most funds were too small to provide services, and so they contracted out to private clinics 
and hospitals creating a large private provision sector. Private institutions were supported 
mainly by payment from private health insurance companies and by arrangements made with 
social insurance organizations (176). Up to the 1970s public hospitals were the dominant 
health care providers in Argentina. In the 1970s and 1980s the predominance of public 
hospitals began to decline and large unregulated private hospitals began to flourish (174). 
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These hospitals provided voluntary schemes mainly for high-income groups, supplementing 
the cover they were obliged to take with Obras Sociales (175).  
4.5.2 Health Care System in Argentina in the 1980s: Economic instability and 
organizational pandemonium 
By the 1980s Argentina had inherited a health care system with a variety of structural 
and economic problems. Investment in health care in the beginning of the 1970s had 
increased, but after the military coup in 1976 the public health system became a target of 
budget cuts (177,178). Structurally, Argentina’s health system had many problems that 
jeopardized the quality and efficiency of care (177). Due to the complex and unplanned 
development of the health system, services lacked co-ordination among providers that 
resulted in a duplication of infrastructure, equipment and specialties in some areas with 
shortages in others (67). Expenditures were planned and executed by a large number of 
institutions at federal, provincial and municipal levels of government, and were poorly 
coordinated and managed. Added to these problems were the economic problems of high 
inflation that led to budget fluctuations and delays, creating serious difficulties for health 
care personnel in planning and service delivery (67). A lack of regulation also led to 
inefficiencies in the private sector such as overstaffing doctors and performing more costly 
procedures than necessary (67).  
Argentina tried to address the economic deficiencies of the health system with the 
return to democracy in the 1980s. Expenditures to health care, both public and private, 
increased from around 7 percent of GDP in 1970 to 9 percent of GDP in 1986 (179) but fell 
again to 7 percent of GDP in 1989 (67,177). While health expenditure in the 1980s was 
relatively high serious deficiencies remained and the country continued to spend more on 
defence than on its public health and educational systems combined (177,179). Financial 
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shortages led many Obras health funds to establish or to increase the size of co-payments, 
placing a greater burden of health care costs on the individual (67).  
The finances invested in health also did not translate into improved care because of 
the financially constrained circumstances of the 1980s and the operational difficulties that 
remained unaddressed in the health sector (67). Public hospitals and national health 
programs continued to be transferred to the provinces over the 1980s in order to ameliorate 
the organizational problems, but without much success. Appeasing economically powerful 
interests also constrained the ability of the government to improve the mismanagement in 
the health sector (67,178). An attempt by the health minister to set up a commission to 
monitor the high cost and low scientific value of the pharmaceuticals sold in Argentina was 
dissolved due to the economic influence of the pharmaceutical industry despite the obvious 
benefits this would have had on a financially burdened health system (67). Building on the 
diminished investment and organizational inefficiencies of the 1970s, economic instability, 
structural disorganization and political cooption further eroded health care in Argentina in 
the 1980s (177). 
4.5.3 The Effect of Economic and Organizational Deterioration in Argentina in the 
1980s: The poor pay the price 
The continued erosion of the health system during the 1980s was felt most acutely 
by the more vulnerable sectors of society (177). Public health care in Argentina suffered 
dramatically over the 1980s to the point where it almost ceased to function and failed to 
provide even minimal services to the population under its care. An accumulated 
deterioration over many years in management, infrastructure and wages was aggravated by 
the hyperinflation of 1989-90, to the point that in the latter year the Ministry could not buy 
vaccines, and maintenance of this crucial program depended on emergency help from 
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UNICEF (179). In 1987 an estimated 25 percent of public health care capacity for short-
term patient care was dilapidated beyond repair, and another 25 percent required extensive 
upgrading; while 50 percent of long-term care public hospital capacity was totally obsolete 
(67). 
Diminishing capacity in public health care coincided with an increase in the 
prevalence of private care facilities that further aggravated the inequities in the system by 
attracting physicians and other health care staff away from public institutions. Increases in 
unemployment and informal workers during the 1980s also expanded the number of patients 
from lower-middle class households that used public hospitals as well as reducing real 
revenues for many Obras through the reduced insurance contributions. Individual health 
care costs also increased due to the introduction of co-payments in the Obras health funds. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s resulted in increasing inequities, inefficiencies and 
consumer costs in a health care system already suffering from a lack of coordination, 
investment and accountability (174). 
4.5.4 Health Care Reform in the 1990s: Introducing competition into the health 
insurance sector  
 The successful implementation of neoliberal policies under Menem’s administration 
in the 1990s paved the way for the introduction of health reforms in Argentina. While there 
was some resistance to health reforms, unions had been weakened over the 1980s and 
remaining opposition was overcome by allocating funding to union groups from World 
Bank and treasury funds to implement insurance reforms. The main goal of the reforms was 
to introduce competition into the health insurance sector (176). In 1991 and 1993 legislation 
gave the Obras Sociales greater freedom to negotiate contracts with health care providers. In 
November 1996 the government provided a basic package of services, which all funds were 
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obliged to provide. The following January all insurance affiliates were given the right to 
select their funds and from January 1998 private insurers were permitted to compete for 
these affiliates on an even footing. In the public sector a separate set of reforms was 
developed with the main goal of increasing the financial independence of hospitals and 
recovering costs from insured groups that used public facilities (175). 
4.5.5 The Social and Economic Implications of Reforms in the 1990s: Coverage, 
inequality, and cost containment  
 Changing patterns of coverage have worsened health care provision in Argentina 
since the implementation of reforms. The number of people covered by the Obras Sociales 
fell during the 1990s, while private and public provision increased. Despite the economic 
growth that occurred in the 1990s, many workers lost insurance protection because of a shift 
to short-term contracts and part-time employment (175,180). In addition there were large 
reductions in public sector jobs and unemployment reached unprecedented levels. In 
contrast, the private health providers experienced a marked increase in affiliation while the 
public sector remained the provider of last resort for a large proportion of the population. 
The decrease in coverage by the Obras Sociales meant that a greater financial burden was 
placed on those who could afford private care as well as a reduction in quality of services for 
those who had to turn to the dilapidated public system.  
Inequalities in access to health services also increased. As a result of the introduction 
of increased competition into Obras Sociales, higher profits were attained by attracting 
higher income workers through targeted marketing while placing obstacles to coverage for 
less attractive groups. Private insurers also intentionally sought out more affluent groups. 
Even public hospitals had increased incentive to treat as many insured individuals as possible 
after reforms, to the detriment of the rest of the population, since costs recovered by 
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insurance were not deducted from their core budgets (175). Barriers to accessing care also 
increased in both private and Obras Sociales health care systems due to co-payments, private 
practitioner’s refusal to see patients due to nonpayments by social insurance funds and 
confusion in the assignment of providers (180). Public institutions intended to insure basic 
health care provision in the country also became more difficult to access. In order to apply 
for free care at public institutions patients had to undergo lengthy means testing, with a 
rejection rate at some hospitals that averaged between 30 and 40 percent. 
Finally an examination of the major goal of reforms, cost containment, provides a 
mixed picture. On the one hand reforms seem to have increased competition and efficiency 
in some areas.  By 1999 the total number of Obras Sociales organizations had fallen from 
320 to around 200, and most of those that had disappeared had small client bases and 
relatively high administration costs. Public hospitals after reforms also became more 
financially autonomous increasing incentives to recoup costs from insurance funds (175). On 
the other hand efficiency was lost with the take-over of the administration of public 
institutions by for profit managed care organizations in the 1990s, which increased 
administrative costs and as a result diverted funds from clinical services. To attract patients 
with private insurance and social insurance plans, Buenos Aires’ public hospitals hired 
management firms that received a fixed percentage of billings (180). Public investment in 
health care also increased due to reforms as both Obras Sociales and public health care 
providers covered an increasingly large proportion of low income, and high risk groups that 
could not afford or did not qualify for private care. Further, the private sector accounted for 
a disproportionate and rising share of total health expenditures estimated at around 42 
percent in 1996.  
 95
The deteriorating health care system over the 1990s culminated in 2001 and 2002 in 
Argentina in a health crisis(181). Pharmacies suspended care due to the inability of social 
services to repay debts. Laboratories, drug companies and pharmacies, increased prices 
exorbitantly as a result of the devalued peso. Already deteriorated public hospitals that were 
facing greater demand due to increased poverty collapsed, due to the shortage in their 
reserves of essential drugs and basic supplies.  Many hospitals had to implement a system of 
exchange of materials to ensure their operation (88).  
4.5.6 Health System Structure in Uruguay  
During the first half of the twentieth century, Uruguay led Latin America in its 
advanced standards of medical care (182,183). The health system in Uruguay by the 1980s 
consisted of a complex system of publicly run health care facilities, private providers, 
insurers and a variety of financiers. Care was financed through the public sector, the social 
security health insurance system (Mutual benefit funds) managed by the Direccion de los 
Segouros Sociales por Enfermedad (DISSE), the regulated not-for-profit sector Institutos de 
Asistencia Medica Colectiva, (IAMCs) and the private for-profit sector (184). The various 
public and private institutions purchased services from and sold services to each other, 
which resulted in strong ties among these public and private actors(182,183).   
4.5.7 Restoring Health Care in the 1980s 
 Health care in Uruguay declined sharply under the military government between 
1973 and 1985 but a reinvestment in health by the democratic government elected in 1985 
made considerable progress in restoring its services. While overall public health care 
spending had been generous under the military, funding had been redirected from public 
facilities toward military hospitals which were open only to relatives of the members of the 
armed forces (145,185). In 1984 total health care spending represented 8.1 percent of GDP, 
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a proportion similar to that of high income countries, but 400,000 Uruguayans were without 
state or private health care coverage, a substantial proportion of the population of 2,989,000. 
After 1985 the newly elected democratic government made a sustained effort to increase 
health care coverage and to redirect spending from the military to social welfare. Total 
spending by the Ministry of Public Health rose dramatically, increasing 34 percent in real 
terms from 1985 to 1987, while defence spending was reduced from 13 percent in 1984 to 
11.8 percent in 1986. In addition, in 1984 all people who worked in the formal sector 
acquired the right to subscribe to a Mutual Benefit Fund and this obligatory health insurance 
was managed by a new office the DISSE.  
Unlike Argentina, increased spending was not due to operational difficulties but 
reflected greater government investment in health care facilities, coverage, equipment and 
medications. From 1985 to 1988 public health care card holders increased from 566,000 to 
692, 000 in the interior but decreased slightly from 323,000 to 310,000 in Montevideo. From 
1984 to 1988 there was also a 17 percent increase in the membership in the Mutual Benefit 
Funds. Along with increased coverage the Mutual Benefit Funds were redistributive in that 
they required the amount of money that was taken out of your salary to be proportional to 
that salary (185). As with the state health provision, the greatest increase in coverage also 
occurred in the interior where it was most needed. A key example of greater investment in 
public health was the efforts made to increase the proportion of infants receiving 
inoculations. The proportion of infants immunized before age one rose from 61 percent to 
79 percent in 1985 to 80 percent to 88 percent in 1987, depending on the particular 
vaccination. In contrast to declining health care delivery in Argentina over the 1980s, overall 
investment and services in health care in the 1980s in Uruguay improved dramatically with 
the return to democracy in 1985.   
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4.5.8 Health Care in the 1990s: Economic hardship and declining care 
 In the 1990s health care in Uruguay did not undergo structural reforms as it did in 
Argentina, but economic constraints led to some policy adaptations (24,185). The increase in 
health coverage by the Mutual Benefit System over the 1980s added financial strains on a 
system that had already been experiencing economic problems (185). Strong state subsidies 
were provided to cover the increased costs in the Mutual Benefit System that consequently 
decreased the amount of money that could be allocated to the public system that was also 
experiencing increased usage (182,185). Some of the additional economic burden of the 
increased coverage was also passed on to members of the social insurance system through 
the increase of co-payments. 
 Uruguay’s more moderate approach to health reforms managed to shelter the 
country from deteriorating into the health care crisis experienced in Argentina though 
Uruguay’s health system also declined over the 1990s. Economic problems persisted and 
inequities increased over the decade but coverage increased and service delivery was 
maintained. In the public system increased disparities between salaries of a public system 
doctor and of a doctor in the social insurance system led to problems in staffing the public 
hospitals (24,182,185). While greater coverage in the public system allowed access by more 
people to services, the quality of services also dropped due to resources being channelled to 
the social insurance system (182,185). This was exasperated by the loss of formal 
employment in Uruguay over the 1990s, which also increased the number of people 
requiring coverage by the public system. With the gradual deterioration of public services 
and the growing cost of the social insurance system, private health care provision grew for 
the middle and upper classes, leading to a continually growing gap in the quality of care 
provided in the public versus the private system. As people with coverage under social 
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insurance were prohibited access to the public system increased co-payments to Mutual 
Benefit Fund members led to some people being unable to access any health care. (80;81). 
Overall the health system over the 1990s transformed into an increasingly stratified system in 
which the poor had access to a progressively deteriorating public system and the wealthy 
turned increasingly to a variety of private provision options.    
Table 4.14: Health Reforms in the 1980s 
Argentina Uruguay 
Health Expenditure 
 Public and private health expenditure 
improved moderately than decreased 
at the end of the decade 
 Obras health funds established or 
increased the size of co-payments 
Health Expenditure 
 Public health care, and social 
insurance funding increased 
Organizational reforms   
 Public hospitals and national health 
programs were transferred to the 
provinces 
 Delayed budget execution 
Organizational reforms  
 Increased investment in public 
healthcare equipment, facilities, 
coverage and medication 
 DISSE placed in management role 
over the Mutual Benefit Fund 
 Salary contributions to Mutual 




Table 4.15: Effects of Health Reforms in the 1980s 
Argentina Uruguay 
Public  
 Health care provisions suffered 
dramatically  (e.g. Immunization 
program required emergency 
assistance) 
 Health care demand increased from 
lower/middle income households  
 Health care capacity for long and 
short term care deteriorated 
 Physician salaries decreased 
 Fluctuations in the level and 
structure of public expenses caused 
difficulty in health planning and 
Public  
 Increased coverage 
 Improved quality of medical care 






Social Insurance (Obra Sociales) 
 Reduced revenues from growing 
unemployment 
 Size of co-payments increased 
Social Insurance (Mutual Benefit Funds) 
 Increased coverage  
 
Private 
 Increased usage 
 Attracted physicians from public care 
 More costly practices than necessary 
used 
 Corruption by economically 




 Not Available 
Co-ordination among providers 
 Equipment, infrastructure and 
specialties duplicated 
 Doctors overstaffed 
Co-ordination among providers 
 Not available 
 
Table 4.16: Health Care Reforms in the 1990s 
Argentina Uruguay 
Public  
 Increased financial independence 
of hospitals 
 Recovering costs from insured 
groups that use public facilities 
Public  
 Greater coverage provided  
 Decreased funding due to increased 
subsidies to Social Insurance  
 Restricted access to those already 
covered under Social insurance  
Social Insurance (Obra Sociales) 
(Competition introduced) 
 Greater freedom to negotiate 
contracts with providers introduced 
 Insurance affiliates given the right to 
select funds 
 Private insures permitted to compete 
for affiliates on an even footing 
Social Insurance (Mutual Benefit Funds) 
  
 Increased subsidies 
 Increased co-payments to members 
Private 
 Private insures permitted to compete 
for affiliates on an even footing 
Private 
 No Reforms 
 
Table 4.17: Effects of Health Reforms in the 1990s 




 Coverage increased  
 Hospitals collapsed due to shortages 
of essential drugs and supplies in 
2001-2002 
 Price of drugs increased due to peso 
devaluation in 2001 - 2002 
 
Public 
 Increased coverage due to increased 
unemployment that caused people to 
lose coverage under social insurance  
 
Social Insurance (Obra Sociales) 
 Coverage decreased due to cost 
increases (copayments) 
 Inability of social insurance to repay 
debts caused suspension of care by 
their members to pharmacies in 2001 
– 2002 
 Price of drugs increased due to peso 
devaluation 
Social Insurance (Mutual Benefit Funds) 
 Increased coverage 
 
Private  
 Usage increased substantially 
Private 




 Targeted already insured individuals 
so they could recoup costs 
 Lengthy means testing required for 
access 
 Reduced quality of services due to 
increased coverage and reduced 
resources 
 Hospitals collapsed due to shortages 
of essential drugs and supplies in 
2001-2002 
Public 
 Decreased physician salaries 
 Quality of services dropped due to 
lack of resources 
Social Insurance (Obra Sociales) 
 Higher income workers targeted 
 Barriers to low income, high risk 
groups implemented 
 Co-payments, nonpayment by social 
insurance to private providers, and 
confusion in assignment of provider 
increased barriers to access 
 Workers lost insurance protection 
because of labour reforms and 
unemployment 
 Inability of social insurance to repay 
debts caused suspension of care by 
their members to pharmacies in 2001 
Social Insurance (Mutual Benefit Funds) 
 Increasing salary of physicians in 
comparison to public sector 
 Lower income decreased access to 






 High income groups targeted 
 Barriers to access increased (e.g. co-
payments) 
Private 
 Increased usage by middle and upper 
income classes. 
 Increased private provision options 
Cost Containment 
Public 
 Recouped more costs from insurance 
funds 
 Increased administration charges 
 Low income and high risk groups 
increased in numbers, increasing 
costs 
 Hospitals collapsed due to shortages 




 Expenditure on public system 
decreased due to increased 
subsidization of Social Insurance  
 
Social Insurance (Obra Sociales) 
 Number of insurance providers 
decreased, those with the highest 
administrative costs closed 
 Low income and high risk groups 
increased, increasing costs 
 Inability of social insurance to repay 
debts caused suspension of care by 
their members to pharmacies in 2001 
- 2002 
Social Insurance (Mutual Benefit Funds) 
 Expenditure on subsidizing system 
continued to grow 
 
Private 
 Increased proportion of total health 
expenditures went to the private 
sector 
Private 
 Not available 
 
4.6 Summary of Neoliberal Reforms and Effects in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 
1990s) 
 
A review of the implementation of neoliberal reforms in Argentina and Uruguay 
over the 1980s and 1990s reveals that generally neoliberal reforms undertaken in Argentina 
were more severe than in Uruguay and that greater reforms were associated with worsening 
conditions in most of the areas studied. In the 1980s, labour market and health care reforms 
demonstrate the most notable differences in the two countries’ approaches, as Argentina 
underwent more extensive reforms in contrast to Uruguay’s more moderate approach. In 
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both areas in Argentina, greater neoliberal reforms were also associated with declining labour 
market conditions and worsening health care services, while in Uruguay increased 
government intervention and regulation in 1985 brought improved health care services and 
labour market conditions. Per capita income and real wages decreased in Argentina and 
unemployment, precarious employment and underemployment increased. In contrast real 
wages in Uruguay increased and unemployment decreased. In Argentina the quality of public 
health care declined dramatically, social insurance experienced increased costs and reduced 
coverage and there was a greater reliance on the private care system. In contrast in Uruguay 
public and social insurance health care provision increased coverage and the quality of 
services improved in the public system.  
Neoliberal reforms to trade undertaken in the 1980s remained moderate in both 
countries and had similarly disappointing results. Manufacturing declined in both countries 
and especially in small and medium sized firms. The limited benefits achieved in trade over 
the 1980s, such as the trade surplus, were only gained at the expense of an economic 
recession in Argentina and from bilateral trade agreements in Uruguay, rather than resulting 
from the benefits of increased openness to the world. Pension reform and privatization of 
state owned enterprises were two areas that remained most similar in both countries over the 
1980s. In both countries only moderate pension reforms took place though Argentina’s 
reforms were more significant than Uruguay’s. The more severe reforms in Argentina were 
reflected in worsened income for pensioners in contrast to improved incomes in Uruguay in 
the mid 1980s though the economic sustainability of both systems continued to decline. The 
privatization of state enterprises was delayed until the 1990s in both countries.  








Trade Increased Increased Similar to Uruguay 
Privatization No reform No reform Similar to Uruguay 
Labour Market Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 











 Trends Argentina Trends Uruguay Relative Status 
(Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Trade Deteriorated Deteriorated  Worse than Uruguay 
Privatization N/A N/A N/A 
 
Labour Market Deteriorated Improved Worse than Uruguay 
Pensions Deteriorated Improved Worse than Uruguay 
Health Care 
Systems 
Deteriorated Improved Worse than Uruguay 
 
 Over the 1990s neoliberal reforms in both countries accelerated and in some cases 
became more integrated though Argentina’s reforms remained more extensive than 
Uruguay’s. Increasing neoliberal reforms in both countries over the 1990s were associated 
with worsening conditions with the more extensive reforms undertaken in Argentina 
resulting in worse outcomes. The greatest difference occurred in labour market reforms, 
privatization of state enterprises and health care reforms. Reforms to the labour market and 
the privatization of state enterprises accelerated dramatically in Argentina over the 1990s in 
comparison to Uruguay’s more gradual pace. The structure of Uruguay’s health care system 
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also remained largely unreformed while Argentina undertook extensive reforms by 
introducing competition into the health insurance sector.  
With increased reforms to the labour market, conditions in Argentina continued to 
decline while Uruguay’s previously improving labour market conditions began to deteriorate, 
though the situation was not as critical as in Argentina. Unemployment, precarious 
employment and underemployment increased in Argentina and after an initial recovery real 
wages also decreased. In Uruguay, unemployment increased over the entire decade and 
precarious employment, underemployment and real wages declined in the second half of the 
1990s. Radical privatization of state enterprises undertaken in Argentina over the 1990s also 
had detrimental impacts. Argentina attained short-term cash for debt payments that 
appeased multilateral institutions, at the expense of long-term cost increases for consumers 
and losses of fiscal revenue from economically self-sustaining or profitable sectors. 
Uruguay’s more gradual approach of increasing competition in rather than selling public 
utilities tempered some of the negative repercussions experienced by Argentina. By avoiding 
the temptation of short-term debt payments, the country managed to prevent increases in 
consumer costs and losses in fiscal revenue, although improvement in the quality of and 
access to services never occurred. In health care Argentina’s more drastic reforms resulted in 
worsening fiscal problems, coverage, and inequality in access to services that culminated in a 
health care crisis in 2001 – 2002. In Uruguay’s largely unreformed system coverage improved 
but inequality and costs continued to worsen though never to the degree they had in 
Argentina. In the light of Argentina’s severe health care crisis, Uruguay’s more moderate 
protectionist approach to reforms showed itself to be more effective at coping with the 
deteriorating social and economic conditions that were causing substantial stresses on the 
health sector. 
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 Reforms undertaken in the area of pensions and trade demonstrate most clearly the 
growing convergence in policy direction in the two countries over the 1990s. Trade reforms 
in both countries accelerated dramatically and became assimilated under Mercosur, while 
pension reform accelerated with both countries adopting a mixed private and public pension 
system. Increased trade liberalization in both countries failed to produce the hoped for trade 
surplus and the marginal successes attained in trade growth were attributed more to trade 
with Mercosur countries rather than being the result of greater openness to the world. 
Manufacturing also continued to suffer in both countries over the 1990s demonstrating the 
continuing failure of trade liberalization to produce increased efficiency and productivity that 
was promised under a more competitive environment. The failure of trade liberalization in 
the 1990s demonstrated that achieving successful trade growth was dependent on complex 
and unpredictable factors such as geographical closeness, historical ties and exchange rate 
levels rather than being an automatic result of openness to the market. Pension reform in 
both countries also resulted in social and economic problems over the 1990s though 
Uruguay’s delayed reforms mitigated some of the negative social and economic impacts. In 
Argentina coverage decreased, inequities increased and the system hit financial collapse in 
the early 2000s. In Uruguay real pensions recovered in the early 1990s but initial results of 
reforms implemented in the late 1990s demonstrate that they did not alleviate the growing 
financial costs of the system or improve coverage.    
Table 4.19: Summary of Neoliberal Reforms and Effects in the 1990s 
Reforms 
 





Trade Increased Increased Similar to Uruguay 
Privatization Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 
Labour Market Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 









 Trends Argentina Trends Uruguay Relative Status 
(Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Trade Deteriorated Deteriorated Similar to Uruguay 
Privatization Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than  
Uruguay 
Labour Market Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
Pension Deteriorated Deteriorated Similar to Uruguay 
Health Care 
Systems 




Chapter 5 Cumulative Effects on Population Health 
 
 Chapter 5 compares the cumulative effects of neoliberal reforms on population 
health in Argentina and Uruguay over the 1980s and 1990s. The progress of the countries’ 
economic (GDP, inflation, debt) and social determinants (poverty, inequality) and their 
corresponding health outcomes (IMR, <5MR) are examined with particular attention paid to 
improved or deteriorated trends and their status relative to the other country. The relative 
progress or deterioration found in the health determinants is than linked to their health 
outcomes creating a comprehensive picture of population health in the countries.   
5.1 Economic Effects 
5.1.1 Economic Growth 
5.1.1.1 Argentina  
In the 1980s Argentina suffered a deep recession associated with the implementation 
of adjustment and economic restructuring policies adopted as a result of the debt crisis. 
(24,116,186). Given the economic crisis being experienced Argentina was forced to generate 
the foreign savings necessary to pay the interest on its foreign debt by contracting domestic 
demand and inducing a recession severe enough to produce the necessary trade surplus 
(116). Over the decade Argentina underwent 5 years of negative growth including 1981 – 
1982, 1985, and 1988-1989, which represented the longest period of stagnation the country 
had experienced in a century (116,179). The recession of 1988-1989 was the most severe of 
the 1980s concluding a decade of dismal economic performance (116). 
 Economic growth in the 1990s in Argentina improved significantly though financial 
collapse in 2001 has demonstrated the continuing fragility of the economy. Discounting the 
1995/96 recession, the Argentinean economy over the 1990s registered rates of growth per 
capita last recorded at the beginning of the century (179). From 1991 to 1994 the country 
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averaged a GDP/capita growth rate of 9 percent per year (159). A contractionary period 
began in early 1995 and lasted until mid 1996 induced by the Mexican crisis in December 
1994 (130). While recovery from the effects of the Mexican crisis of 1995 was fairly quick, 
with real GDP growth of 5.5 percent in 1996 and an impressive 8.1 percent in 1997, 
Argentina could not return to strong growth after the recession that followed the successive 
shocks from East Asia, Russia and Brazil in 1998. In 1999, following the 1998 international 
crisis, GDP fell by 3 percent and Argentina entered fully into recession (187).  In 2001, after 
a decade of remarkable growth, Argentina entered into an economic crisis in which it 
experienced economic contraction that rivalled the U.S.'s Great Depression (188).   
 While the 1990s’ impressive record of growth was championed by the IMF and the 
World Bank as a model of success, the collapse of the economy in 2001 shed new critical 
views on the accomplishments of this decade (188,189). Economic recovery over the 1990s 
has been critiqued for being debt-led growth rather than export-led growth (189). With the 
stabilization of the economy in 1991 and the positive external environment, huge capital 
inflows into Argentina occurred, leading to drastic increases in consumption and, hence, 
increases in GDP/capita (190). At the same time consumption was increasing domestic 
producers were failing to become major competitors in the international market. (189). Even 
though the aggregate growth rate was impressive, economic sectors and regions more 
exposed to foreign competition fared poorly compared to the average trend and sometimes 
experienced contraction (190). The poor adaptation of domestic producers to liberalization 
in conjunction with increased imports meant that when growth occurred it was due to a 




Turning to Uruguay over the 1980s it is evident that the debt crisis also had serious 
implications for the country, though relative to Argentina its effect on economic 
performance was not as devastating. Uruguay only experienced two years of recession from 
1982-84, and with the return of democratic government in 1985 growth was renewed (98). 
From 1986-87 a strong growth performance occurred based on export demand from Brazil 
and Argentina (116,144). By 1988 the recovery was proving unsustainable and GDP growth 
ceased though it never fell to negative growth as it had in Argentina (144).    
 Economic growth in Uruguay over the 1990s followed a similar pattern to Argentina, 
with overall positive growth rates that culminated in recession at the end of the 1990s and a 
financial crisis in the 2000s, though it never reached the economic devastation that 
Argentina experienced. As with Argentina the central economic problem with Uruguay over 
the 1990s was the strong trade deficit that was the result of a debt led growth pattern fuelled 
by and highly dependent on capital inflows (191). Generally over the decade Uruguay 
recorded positive growth rates with an average GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent but a closer 
breakdown of the economic trends reveals a less optimistic picture. In the early 1990s 
Uruguay underwent a period of recovery with GDP growth averaging 4 percent between 
1990 and 1994 (144). Following the Mexican crisis Uruguay entered into recession, with 
GDP declining by 2.5 percent in 1995 (192). With the help of the IMF economic activity 
quickly recovered, expanding by almost 5 percent in 1996 (192). This recovery lasted only 
until 1999 when Uruguay again entered into a deep recession due to several external factors 
including the devaluation of the Brazilian real, the beginning of a profound recession in 
Argentina, a severe drought and low commodity prices (193,194). After 1999 Uruguay 
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5.1 Economic Growth in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 1990s) 
 
5.1.2 Inflation 
Both countries suffered from high and increasing inflation rates over the 1980s, 
though Argentina fared substantially worse than Uruguay. Inflation in Argentina was high 
and gradually worsened until it culminated in a hyperinflationary period at the end of the 
Economic Growth 1980s 
 Trends  Contributing Factors 




 Longest period of 
stagnation in a century 
 Recession induced to 
provide necessary 
trade surplus to pay 
foreign debt 
Uruguay  Only two years of 
recession (1982-1984) 
 Growth (1985 – 1987) 
with return to 
democracy 
 1988 GDP growth 
ceased though never 
turned to negative 
growth 
 Growth due to 
demand from 
Argentina and Brazil 
Economic Growth 1990s 
 Trends  Contributing Factors 
Argentina  High growth (1990-
1994,1997-1998) 
 1995/96, 1999 recession 
 2001 economic crisis 
 Mexican crisis 1995 
 International crisis 
East Asia, Russia and 
Brazil 1998 
 Debt led growth 
versus export led 
growth 
Uruguay  Growth (1990-1994, 
1996-1998) 
 Recession 1995 
 Recession 1998 onwards 
 Mexican crisis 1995 





 Debt led growth 
 
 112
1980s (43). For only two years out of the decade did inflation dip below 100 percent (195). 
Inflation rates over the decade went from101 percent in 1980 to 672 percent in 1985, which 
provoked the newly elected democratic government to implement a wage-price freeze that 
had temporary success in bringing inflation down to below 100 percent. (43). By 1989 prices 
were again rising rapidly and inflation swelled to 3080 percent (43). Inflation in the 1980s in 
Uruguay was also high and increased over the decade though it never reached the 
hyperinflationary levels of Argentina (144). In contrast to Argentina inflation started the 
decade at 63 percent fell to 19 percent in 1982 and steadily rose until 1990 where it peaked at 
113 percent. (144,163). 
In the 1990s inflation in Argentina changed significantly. Under the Convertibility 
Plan23 implemented in 1991 Argentina ceased to be a high inflation country (195). In the 
period 1991-1994 Argentina showed a dramatic decrease in inflation though it remained 
higher than the average international inflation rate (195). The inflation rate (over 2000 
percent in 1990) was reduced to double digits in 1992, was less than 1 percent in 1996 and 
1997 and became deflation in 1999 and 2000 (43,163). Inflation in the 1990s in Uruguay also 
fell but not as rapidly or as drastically. In the early 1990s inflation was reduced from 113 
percent in 1990 to 54 percent in 1993 and fell gradually until it reached 5 percent in 2000 
(163). 
Table 5.2 Inflation in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 1990s) 
 1980s 1990s 
                                                 
23 A 1991 law that established an exchange rate between the Argentine currency and the U.S. 
dollar at a fixed parity of one to one (137). 
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Argentina  High and increasing 
inflation over the 
1980s 
 End of the 1980s 
hyperinflation  
 1980 – 101 percent, 
1989 – 3080 percent 
 Drastically decreased 
to 1 percent in 1996 
 Deflation in 1999-
2000 




 No hyperinflation 
 1980 – 63 percent, 
1990 113 percent 
 Fell gradually to 5 
percent in 2000. 
 
5.1.3 Debt 
In the 1980s Argentina, like other Latin American countries, experienced a severe 
debt crisis. Over the late 1970s and early 1980s Argentina’s debt grew rapidly leading to 
massive capital flight, an exchange rate crisis, devaluation and default in 1982 (196,197). 
Total external debt in US dollars rose from $27.16 billion in 1980 to $43.63 billion in 1982 
due in part to the rise in international interest rates and the devaluation of the peso. The 
public sector proportion of the foreign debt also rose in these years as a result of the 
absorption of a considerable proportion of private sector debt that had been guaranteed by 
government. From 1982 to 1990, despite austerity measures and international private credit 
rationing, the debt kept increasing, though at a slower pace. By 1990 total external debt had 
reached $62.23 billion and per capita public and publicly guaranteed external debt had grown 
from $362 million in 1980 to $1452 billion.  
The 1990s in Argentina were characterized by accelerated indebtedness that resulted 
in the country once again falling into financial crisis, with subsequent capital flight24 and 
                                                 
24 The movement of money from one investment to another in search of greater stability or 
increased returns. Sometimes specifically refers to the movement of money from 
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devaluation and eventual loan payment default in 2001 (196,197). Growth in the rate of 
indebtedness was particularly sharp after 1992 and was largely generated by the private 
sector, though public sector debt became a greater issue in the second half of the 1990s 
(196). The Brady agreement signed in December 1992, which swapped $21 billion debt to 
commercial banks plus $8.3 billion in late payments for 30-year Brady bonds, did not stop 
the debt from growing at an alarming rate (197). Total external debt rose from $68.35 billion 
in 1992 to $145.88 billion in 2000 and per capita public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt went from $1452 in 1990 to $2360 in 2000 (163).  After the crisis the IMF, previous 
supporters of Argentina’s policy reforms, blamed failures in fiscal policy for the financial 
disaster (196,197). Alternative views placed responsibility for the debt build up on a 
combination of external shocks, the privatization of the social security system and neoliberal 
policies supported by the IMF that were compounded by the 1998 recession. While there are 
a variety of views on the causes of the debt build up, it is evident that the acceleration of 
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s did not, as they had been intended to, prevent the financial 
crisis and popular revolt that brought down five governments between 2001 and January 
2002.  
 Like Argentina the debt crisis in Uruguay was severe in the 1980s leading to capital 
flight though Uruguay never defaulted on its debt. Total external debt increased significantly 
in the early 1980s rising from $1.66 billion in 1980 to $2.65 billion in 1982, also due to rising 
interest rates and the depreciation of the peso (163,171). By 1990 total external debt had 
almost doubled to $4.42 billion. Public foreign debt also grew significantly over the early 
                                                                                                                                                 
investments in one country to another in order to avoid country specific risk (such as 
inflation or political turmoil). Often the outflows from capital fight are large enough to 
affect a country’s entire financial system. 
http://www.investorwords.com/704/capital_flight.html 
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1980s because of the purchase of loans from failing private banks (98). By 1990 public 
foreign debt had reached $980.36 million from $386.75 million in 1980. While Uruguay’s 
total external debt appears to be a fraction of the debt of Argentina a look at the per capita 
debt demonstrates that it was a high burden to be carried by its much smaller population. 
Per capita public and publicly guaranteed debt was actually higher in Uruguay than in 
Argentina at the beginning of the 1980s. While Uruguay started the decade with a higher per 
capita public and publicly guaranteed debt, by 1990 Uruguay’s per capita debt was $980 
while Argentina’s had swelled to $1452 (163). 
 In the 1990s Uruguay’s debt continued to increase steadily and culminated in 2002 in 
financial crisis shortly after Argentina’s, reflecting the increased integration of their 
economies. Total debt in Uruguay increased from $4.42 billion in 1980 to $8.2 billion in 
2000 (163).  Per capita public and publicly guaranteed debt also increased substantially from 
$980 in 1990 to $1828 in 2000 (163). While Uruguay’s debt never increased to Argentine 
levels the financial crisis in 2002 that triggered massive runs on the banks and street riots 
demonstrated the growing symmetry between Argentina’s and Uruguay’s economies and 
their fragility to external influences (171).  The financial crisis was triggered by a currency 
devaluation in Brazil in 1999, which made Uruguayan goods less competitive, and an 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001 that curtailed beef exports to North America. 
Starting in late 2001, the economic crisis in Argentina also undermined Uruguay's economy, 
causing exports to Argentina and tourist revenues to fall dramatically. In mid-2002 Argentine 
withdrawals from Uruguayan banks started a bank run that was only overcome by massive 
borrowing from international financial institutions. While the mounting debt over the 1990s 
and financial crisis in 2003 in Uruguay never reached the extreme collapse experienced in 
Argentina a similar trend of debt accumulation and crisis occurred in both countries.   
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Table 5.3: Debt in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 1990s)  
Total External Debt (US$ billions) 
 




27.16 62.23 145.88 
Uruguay 
 
1.66 4.42 8.2 




1980 1990 2000 
Argentina 
 
362.39 1451.72 2359.6 
Uruguay 
 
386.75 980.36 1828.25 
 
5.2 Social Effects 
5.2.1 Poverty 
 Poverty in Argentina over the 1980s rose very sharply, increasing in the early 1980s 
and skyrocketing during the hyperinflationary period in the late 1980s (67). In the 
Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires the percentage of the households in poverty went from 
4.9 percent in 1980 to 16.2 percent in 1990. A central cause of increasing poverty over the 
decade was the situation of the labour market. Over the 1980s increasing open 
unemployment, informal employment and especially the decline in real wages were the 
principal factors influencing the deterioration of living conditions in the country. In contrast 
to Argentina, Uruguay underwent an increase in poverty under the military government but 
then experienced a dramatic decline in poverty over the late 1980s with the return to 
democracy (198,198,199). In 1981 the percentage of households living in poverty went from 
6 percent in 1981 to 9.2 percent in 1986 to 7.2 percent in 1990. Improvements in the 
poverty levels in Uruguay in the late 1980s were largely effected by the situation of the 
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labour market in which the increase of real wages and decrease in unemployment led to 
declining poverty rates (145). 
 By all indicators, poverty over the 1990s in Argentina continued to increase 
dramatically, if episodically. Looking at a break down of the trends over the decade, poverty 
fell in the early 1990s due to the dramatic reduction of inflation though it remained almost 
double its 1980s levels. Poverty increased between 1992 and 1996 despite a significant 
growth in GDP and continued low levels of inflation.  After a temporary reduction around 
1998 poverty increased again, fuelled by the economic recession that started in the second 
half of 1998 (200). While poverty levels in the late 1990s never reached the levels of 1990 the 
comparatively lower levels of inflation make the growth in poverty over the decade more 
significant than the absolute numbers reflect. ECLAC data show that the percentage of 
homes in poverty in the Metropolitan area fell from 16.2 in 1990 to 9.8 in 1992, increasing 
again to 13.1 in 1999 (200). The dramatic increase in poverty in the 1990s is more evident 
when considered relative to other Latin American countries; Argentina ranks third according 
to points of poverty increase, and first if the increase is measured in percentages (200). The 
growth of poverty over the decade was due to the fall of real household income associated 
with the recession, the deterioration in the terms of trade, and a worsening income 
distribution (201). 
In comparison to Argentina and most other Latin American countries, Uruguay’s 
poverty levels fared much better over the 1990s.  While measurements of poverty in 
Uruguay are not as unified as in Argentina, most indicators show an initial decrease in 
poverty levels until 1992, coinciding with decreased inflation, followed by a gradual increase 
over the rest of the decade(199).  According to ECLAC, the percentage of homes living in 
poverty in the metropolitan area decreased from 7.2 in 1990 to 3.7 in 1992 and then rose 
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again to 5.8 in 1999(99). Although Uruguay’s poverty trends reflected a similar pattern to 
Argentina its overall levels remained significantly lower than Argentina. Uruguay also began 
and ended the decade with one of the lowest poverty levels in the region (199).   
 
Table 5.4: Poverty in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 1990s) (Metropolitan Area,  
Percent Households) 
 1980s  
 
1990s 
Argentina  Increased 
dramatically (4.9 
percent in 1980 to 
16.2 percent in 1990) 
 Decreased in early 
1990s (16.2 percent 
in 1990 to 9.8 
percent in 1992) 
 Increased from 1992 
onwards (9.8 percent 
in 1992 to 13.1 
percent in 1999) 
Uruguay  Increased under 
military dictatorship 
(6 percent in 1981 to 
9.2 percent in 1986) 
 Decreased with the 
return of democracy 
(9.2 percent in 1986 
to 7.2 percent in 
1990) 
 Decreased in early 
1990s (7.2 percent in 
1990 to 3.7 percent 
in 1992) 
 Increased moderately 
(3.7 percent in 1992 




Table 5.5: Poverty Rates (Percent) in Argentina and Uruguay (1980s, 1990s)  
 1980, 1981 
 





16.2 9.8 13.1 
Uruguay 6 
 




In examining inequities Argentina and Uruguay provide an interesting comparison as 
traditionally they have been two of the most equal countries in Latin America (200). 
Following the debt crisis and the deepening of neoliberal reforms over the 1980s the once 
almost identical countries began to drift apart. As Argentina implemented more drastic 
reforms over the 1980s its income distribution began to worsen while Uruguay’s more 
moderate implementation of reforms corresponded with decreased inequities. Despite 
beginning the 1980s at a relatively low level of inequality in comparison to other Latin 
American countries, by the end of the 1980s Argentina’s income distribution had 
deteriorated to a moderately high rate. The Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality 
in which zero equals perfect equality and one equals perfect inequality) for Argentina was 
0.365 in 1980 and 0.423 by 1990 with most of this increase occurring during the 
macroeconomic crisis of the late 1980s (99,200,202). Argentina’s worsening inequality during 
the 1980s was connected to the reduction of real wages in conjunction with growing 
inequality in the dispersion of wages. Not only did real wages decrease over the 1980s but 
decreases were more extreme in the lower income groups than in the highest income groups, 
which experienced relatively little loss (201). 
In contrast to Argentina, Uruguay’s inequality at the beginning of the 1980s was 
slightly worse but by the end of the 1980s had become more equitable. The Gini coefficient 
for Uruguay fell from 0.379 in 1981 to 0.353 in 1990 (99,199). Differences between the two 
countries’ income distribution can be attributed largely to the differing situation of their 
labour markets over the decade. In Uruguay’s labour market the opposite trend to Argentina 
can be seen in which the recovery of real wages and pensions after the return to democracy 
resulted in a slight improvement in the distribution of incomes(145,201,203). Over the 
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1980s, then, a dramatic shift can be observed in which Uruguay’s income distribution 
improves at the same time that Argentina’s worsens, reversing their starting positions.   
Unlike the 1980s, Argentina and Uruguay both experienced increases in inequality 
over the 1990s, although Argentina’s income distribution deteriorated at a greater pace and 
to a larger extent then in Uruguay and Uruguay’s inequality improved before worsening at 
the end of the decade. All measures of income inequality over the decade show the same 
increasing pattern in Argentina. The Gini coefficient, for instance, increased from 0.423 in 
1990 to 0.439 in 1994 where it stayed until 1997 and then increased substantially at the end 
of the decade (200,204). It is important to recognize that it was not only the poor but also 
the middleclass that suffered a drop in their share of per capita income (200). The income 
share of the bottom 7 deciles all fell over the decade; the poorest decile’s share of national 
income fell from 1.8 percent in 1992 to just 1.2 percent in 2000. On the other end of the 
income spectrum, the richest decile saw its share of national income increase from 34.1 in 
1992 to 37.4 in 2000. 
 Uruguay also experienced increasing inequality over the 1990s, though the shifts in 
the distribution of wealth were not as drastic and were preceded by improved equality during 
the first part of the decade. The Gini coefficient in Uruguay improved marginally from 0.353 
in 1990 to 0.3 in 1994 where it stayed until 1997 before worsening again in 1998 (199). 
Similar to Argentina, the share of national income in Uruguay increased for the wealthiest 
income groups while decreased in the middle to poorest groups, though these changes were 
small in comparison to Argentina’s (199). The poorest decile’s share of national income, for 
example, went from 1.8 percent in 1992 to 1.7 percent in 2000, while the richest decile 
experiences an increase from 31.6 percent in 1992 to 33 percent in 2000 (199).  
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Both countries experienced a growth in inequality that coincided with intensified 
neoliberal reforms during the decade; the substantial difference in the magnitude of the 
changes in inequalities they experienced also correlate with the differences in how 
extensively the countries implemented those reforms. Income inequality in Argentina in the 
1990s rose more than in any other Latin American country (96,202) while income 
distribution in Uruguay remained the most egalitarian in Latin America, despite increasing at 
the end of the 1990s (199,201,205).  
Table 5.6: Gini Coefficient In Argentina and Uruguay (ECLAC) 
 
 
1980/1981 1990 1994 1997 1998 
Argentina 
 








5.3 Health Effects 
5.3.1 Infant/Under 5 Mortality Rates 
   IMR and <5MR in both countries generally continued to improve during the 1980s 
and 1990s (163). This improvement was not surprising given that IMR and <5MR are 
determined by the accumulation of a wide variety of factors that are a result of past 
improvements, such as the number of public hospitals and doctors per inhabitant, improved 
water and sanitation, higher educational attainment and inoculations (67). Given the 
difficulty in separating the effects of past developments on current health status a more 
sensitive measure of changes in health requires examining not just improvements in these 
indicators but also their rate of reduction. Although Uruguay had a higher IMR at the 
beginning of the 1980s, by 1990 Uruguay’s IMR was lower than Argentina’s (Figure 5.2 and 
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5.3). Over the 1980s Argentina’s IMR fell by 24.2 percent while Uruguay’s fell by 45.95 
percent, almost double the rate of decline as Argentina’s (Table 5.6).  <5MR presents a 
similar picture; Uruguay began the decade with a higher <5MR than Argentina but by 1990 
its rate was below that of Argentina’s. Argentina’s <5MR decreased by 26.3 percent from 
1980 to 1990 almost half of the 42.9 percent decrease that took place over the decade in 
Uruguay (Figure 5.5 and 5.5).  
A very different picture of health emerged in the 1990s.  Despite Uruguay’s 
comparatively better rates of IMR and <5MR from 1990 to 2000, percent differences show 
that Argentina’s IMR decreased by 28 percent and Uruguay’s by 25 percent demonstrating 
that the rate of improvement in Uruguay’s IMR was declining and becoming more similar to 
Argentina’s (Figure 5.2 – 5.5 and Table 5.6) (163). Similarly over the same period Argentina’s 
<5MR decreased by 28.6 percent and Uruguay’s by 29.2 percent, repeating the pattern of a 
diminished rate of reduction in Uruguay and a greater mirroring of reduction rates in 














1990s population health indicators showed Uruguay’s health deteriorated and became more 
aligned with Argentina’s though it maintained a better relative level of health. An analysis of 
the determinants of health confirmed and strengthened the findings of the health outcomes. 
General progress of the countries’ economic and social determinants of health were reflected 
in better rates of reduction and lower levels of IMR and <5MR and general deteriorations in 
the health determinants corresponded to slower rates of reduction and higher levels of IMR 
and <5MR.  
 
  





Chapter 6: Reflecting on the Progress of Neoliberal Reforms in 
Argentina and Uruguay 
 
 This Chapter discusses the effects of neoliberal reforms in Argentina and Uruguay 
on the cumulative population health of the countries during the implementation of SAPs. 
Comparisons between the differences in degree and pace of reforms in the countries and the 
progress of their population health are made. The discussion draws on the literature and data 
analysis of reforms in Chapter 4 and the data analysis of the cumulative population health in 
Chapter 5 to illustrate key findings and patterns highlighted by the study. The Chapter 
concludes with a summary of the major conclusions, the implications for future research of 
neoliberal economic globalization, an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the study 
and a short reflection on the experience of carrying out this research.   
 SAPs have made a long lasting and deep impression on Latin America (4,4-6,49).  As 
one of the most indebted regions in the world Latin America was propelled into the hands 
of IFIs which restructured the economy on a neoliberal model. The role of the state with all 
its progressive economic and social welfare functions was sharply reduced and the 
economies were opened via trade and financial liberalization to the unimpeded forces of 
world market competition. Since the implementation of SAPs mounting evidence of growing 
poverty, inequality, economic crises and declining health challenge the appropriateness of 
continuing to implement neoliberal policies.   
  Despite this evidence, the debate over the success or failure of SAPs has been in 
some regards a difficult argument to win. SAPs, as already noted, have not been 
implemented in a way that reflects a pure neoliberal model (37). Often countries have 
progressed toward neoliberalism in an erratic manner, for instance, liberalizing their finances 
and trade before tackling less popular reforms in their social systems.  This unplanned and 
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often incomplete adoption of neoliberal policies allows neoliberal advocates to dismiss the 
problems of countries who are in the process of adopting such reforms. In the context of 
economic collapse and growing poverty the fault is often placed on the partial adoption of 
neoliberal prescriptions (4). Even in situations in which countries have been ‘model patients’ 
economic and social problems are written off as unfortunate but necessary short term 
transitional costs (4,5). In this debate, in which the cure is always more time and more 
reforms, the comparison of the progress of Argentina and Uruguay who adopted neoliberal 
reforms to different degrees and at different paces is particularly useful.  The following 
section provides this study’s conclusions by answering the research question: How did SAPs 
and the attendant domestic policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s affect the population 
health of Argentina and Uruguay?  
6.1 Argentina and Uruguay: The Tortoise and the Hare 
The progress of the two countries on cumulative population health was generally 
found to reflect the severity of and speed with which neoliberal reforms were implemented. 
The greater the speed and severity of the reforms adopted, the worse the cumulative 
population health effects. The greatest differences between the countries were found during 
the 1980s, mirroring the more rapid and intense implementation of neoliberal reforms in 
Argentina in comparison to the more gradual and modest reforms undertaken in Uruguay. 
In the 1990s, differences in the effects of neoliberal reforms on population health were 
reduced as Uruguay’s adoption of neoliberal reforms accelerated and became more 
integrated with Argentina’s. Even so, the more moderate approach to reforms in Uruguay in 
the 1990s coincided with that country’s better overall population health effects. 
6.1.1 1980s: A Case of Less is More. 
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Argentina in the 1980s experienced extensive labour market and health care reforms, 
moderate trade and pension reforms. In contrast, Uruguay undertook only moderate labour 
market, pension and trade reforms and increased its protectionist policies in health care. 
Coinciding with the accelerated reforms Argentina experienced severe economic stagnation 
over the 1980s, including 5 years of negative growth. In contrast economic recession in the 
early 1980s in Uruguay reversed to economic growth in 1985. While Uruguay’s growth 
ceased at the end of the decade it never turned to negative growth as it did in Argentina. 
Inflation in the 1980s also showed a bleaker picture for Argentina. Inflation started high, 
increased dramatically and ended the decade in a hyperinflationary period. In Uruguay 
inflation also started high but fell in 1982 increasing toward the end of the decade but never 
reaching hyperinflation as it had in Argentina. Debt in both countries also increased over the 
1980s, but more rapidly in Argentina than in Uruguay. Public and publicly guaranteed debt 
per capita in Uruguay was actually greater than Argentina at the beginning of the decade but 
finished the decade at a lower level.  
 Social indicators over the 1980s show a similarly worse pattern for Argentina than 
Uruguay. Although at the beginning of the decade Argentina had slightly better levels of 
income inequality, Uruguay’s inequality declined while Argentina’s increased so that by the 
end of the decade Uruguay had lower levels than Argentina. Similarly poverty in Argentina 
increased over the 1980s, while in Uruguay poverty decreased with the return to democracy 
in 1985 and ended the decade at a lower level than Argentina.  
Corresponding to the deteriorated economic and social determinants in Argentina 
health indicators reflect a worse situation for Argentina. Argentina began the decade with 
lower IMR and <5MR compared to Uruguay but by the end of the decade the opposite was 
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the case. Percent decreases demonstrated that during the 1980s Uruguay’s <5MR and IMR 
decreased at almost twice the rate of Argentina’s.    
6.1 Neoliberal Reforms and Cumulative Population Health Effects in the 1980s  
Neoliberal Reforms 1980s 
 




Trade Increased Increased Similar to Uruguay 
Privatization No reform No reform Similar to Uruguay 
Labour Market Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 









Cumulative Population Health Effects 1980s 
 
 Trends Argentina Trends Uruguay Relative Status 
(Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Growth Deteriorated Improved  Worse than Uruguay 
Inflation Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
Debt Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
Inequality Deteriorated Improved Worse than Uruguay 
Poverty Deteriorated Improved Worse than Uruguay 
 Relative Trends (Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Relative Status (Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Infant MR Slower rate of reduction than 
Uruguay 
Higher rate than Uruguay 
Under 5 MR Slower rate of reduction than 
Uruguay 
Higher rate than Uruguay 
 
6.1.2 1990s: A Case of Less Would Have Been More 
In the 1990s as neoliberal reforms began to accelerate in both countries and as 
Uruguay’s reforms became more aligned with Argentina’s, the population health of the 
countries worsened and began to more closely resemble each other. While conditions 
 130
worsened in both countries overall Uruguay’s economic, social and health indicators 
remained better than Argentina’s reflecting the more moderate reforms undertaken in 
Uruguay. In Argentina trade, privatization, labour market, pension, and health care reforms 
all accelerated drastically in the 1990s. In Uruguay trade and pension reforms accelerated 
most drastically and became more aligned with Argentina. Privatization was initiated in the 
1990s and labour market reforms increased though both of these reforms were more 
moderate than Argentina’s. Health care reform in Uruguay varied the most from Argentina’s, 
as it increased its protectionist policies rather than introducing neoliberal reforms.  
In general accelerating neoliberal reforms over the 1990s coincided with continuing 
economic problems although some of the economic indicators showed significant 
improvements. Argentina and Uruguay experienced markedly reduced inflation over the 
1990s and improved economic growth but debt continued to grow rapidly in both countries. 
In addition to continued problems with debt growth, economic growth in the 1990s in both 
countries was also critiqued for being debt led rather than reflecting a genuine improvement 
in the economic situation of the countries as was evidenced by its culmination in recession in 
the late 1990s and economic crisis at the turn of the century. In general, economic 
determinants of health in Argentina and Uruguay over the 1990s showed similar trends 
though Uruguay fared somewhat better than Argentina. Uruguay maintained lower public 
per capita debt and the economic crisis in Uruguay in the 2000s never reached the financial 
collapse experienced in Argentina. 
 Over the 1990s social determinants show a deteriorating trend in both countries as 
neoliberal reforms increased and became more integrated. Argentina’s more rapid and 
extensive reforms were also connected to worse social outcomes than in Uruguay.   
Inequality in Argentina increased in the early 1990s, levelled off and then worsened again 
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dramatically at the end of the 1990s. In comparison Uruguay’s inequality improved in the 
early 1990s with reduced inflation, levelled off and then significantly worsened at the end of 
the decade, though it remained considerably lower than Argentina’s. Poverty levels in both 
countries decreased until 1992 due to decreased inflation and then increased over the rest of 
the decade though Uruguay’s poverty levels remained much lower than Argentina’s.  
Health indicators over the 1990s repeat the pattern of economic and social 
determinants. Differences in IMR and <5MR between the countries diminished over the 
decade and the rate of decrease of Uruguay’s indicators slowed down to a similar pace as 
Argentina’s. Despite growing similarities in the countries’ health indicators, Uruguay’s IMR 
and <5 MR remained lower at the end of the decade reflecting the more moderate reforms 
undertaken in Uruguay. 
6.2 Neoliberal Reforms and Cumulative Population Health Effects in the 1990s 
Neoliberal Reforms 1990s 
 




Trade Increased Increased Similar to Uruguay 
Privatization Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 
Labour Market Increased Increased Greater than 
Uruguay 







Cumulative Population Health Effects 1990s 
 
 Trends Argentina Trends Uruguay Relative Status 
(Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Growth Improved (Debt led) Improved (Debt led) Worse than Uruguay 
Inflation Improved Improved Better than  
Uruguay 
Debt Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
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Inequality Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
Poverty Deteriorated Deteriorated Worse than Uruguay 
 Relative Trends (Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Relative Status (Argentina to 
Uruguay) 
Infant MR Similar rate of reduction as 
Uruguay 
Higher rate than Uruguay 
Under 5 MR Similar rate of reduction as 
Uruguay 
Higher rate than Uruguay 
 
 
6.2 Conclusion  
 This study supports the findings of previous research that demonstrated that 
countries that have maintained more protectionist economic, social and health policies while 
applying SAPs have been better able to protect the health of the most vulnerable sectors of 
society.  The neoliberal promise of economic growth and stability leading to poverty 
reduction and improved health was contradicted by Uruguay’s and Argentina’s experience. 
The failure of neoliberal policies in this case study was not due to the incomplete adoption 
of SAPs, as the more extreme and rapid reforms undertaken in Argentina proved to be more 
socially and economically destructive. Rather than validating the predominant view that 
welfare states are to blame for problems this study found that social safety nets and 
government interventions protect countries from negative health impacts while neoliberal 
reforms were associated with decreasing health status.  
 The use of a comparative case study and the globalization and health framework 
in this study of SAPs also demonstrates a useful methodological approach for future studies 
of neoliberal policies present in PRSPs and implicit in the conditions put on other ongoing 
debt, trade, aid and credit negotiations (7,17,17). As critiques of SAPs specifically and 
neoliberal policies generally accumulate, modifications to neoliberal approaches have been 
adopted in an attempt to address their shortcomings without substantially changing their 
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basic economic approach (5,37). PRSPs, for instance, purport to address poverty by better 
integrating the poor into the market economy through passive methods such as increased 
monitoring of impoverished populations (14). Poverty reduction, though, essentially remains 
a repercussion of market-driven growth rather than being a focus of these strategies. PRSPs 
remain silent to the problems of unequal market power, consolidating corporate power, 
restricted migration and access to rich country economies, and of local political inequalities 
(e.g. elite co-option, under regulated monopolies, rising global and local inequality). These 
programs also do not deviate from SAPs approach of imposing standardized policies on 
diverse country contexts (14). PRSPs’ proposed ‘country ownership’ of economic programs 
has meant little more than government acceptance of IFI-promoted policies rather than a 
national consensus developed around a home-grown policy program (5). Further case studies 
of ongoing neoliberal policies can reveal if these superficial modifications are able to alter 
the detrimental economic, social and health effects that have been noted by this and other 
studies.  
6.3 Strengths and Limitations 
 A number of strengths and limitations were encountered in this study. A key 
strength of the study was its comprehensive approach.  The study incorporated multiple 
sources of data from interdisciplinary sources that encompassed key health determining 
pathways from the macroeconomic to the individual level. This broad approach provided a 
rich understanding of the complex ways by which SAPs affects health. Comparing two 
countries through the use of comparative historical analysis also allowed for changes in the 
countries economic, social and health outcomes to be more meaningfully understood as they 
could be compared relative to the other countries progress. The comparative case study 
further helped to highlight the neoliberal policies implemented under SAPs as the cause of 
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the changes as another country experiencing similar contexts but different policies was 
found to have different outcomes.  Finally, the interdisciplinary population health approach 
of the study also created a more rounded understanding of the policy implications of SAPs 
by examining health through a political, economic and social lens.  
 While using multiple data sources, comparative methodology and an 
interdisciplinary approach provided a well-rounded examination of the effects of SAPs on 
health it also created many logistical and theoretical difficulties. Choosing appropriate data 
sources and integrating multidisciplinary literature into a cohesive argument required 
extensive expertise in historical, economic, social and political disciplines. In order to 
supplement my academic background in health, English and conflict resolution, committee 
members with backgrounds in Latin American history, economics and health were chosen. 
Despite this interdisciplinary committee the challenges of understanding economic data and 
literature, and the historical contexts of the countries in the depth and detail necessary for 
this study, limited the conclusions and interpretations that may have been made by someone 
with a broader knowledge of all these areas. 
 Conducting retrospective global health research in LMICs from outside of the 
countries studied also had many challenges in obtaining reliable and comparable data. As 
SAPs were implemented over 25 years ago in LMIC contexts published data sources and 
literature were difficult to obtain. Data collection methods were less rigorous in LMICs than 
would have been encountered in high income countries, the 1980s had greater technological 
limitations and accessing data from a distance limited the ability to assemble information. In 
particular disaggregated data on a broad spectrum of health outcomes were difficult to 
access, precluding more in depth interpretations of the health effects of SAPs on different 
income, gender, ethnic or age groups. Attempts to overcome this limitation were made with 
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limited success by spending three weeks at the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 
in Washington D.C. Many challenges were encountered in searching for data such as old 
computers containing data that had been shut down and moved to storage and many hard 
copies from countries that had been destroyed due to lack of library space. Data that was 
found was often not collected in a consistent manner with other countries or over the 
twenty year time period in which SAPs were implemented, making a comparison or 
interpretation of trends over time impossible. Attempts to visit the World Bank or have 
information couriered to PAHO from the World Bank also failed due to the post 9-11  “red 
alert” status of the organization. In addition, many people working with health data in 
Argentina and Uruguay were contacted, which produced numerous promises of information 
but little actual usable material. 
 Another difficulty in the study arose from the language barrier and the lack of 
lived experience in the countries studied. Many of the data sources and some of the literature 
in the study were in Spanish. While I have an intermediate level of Spanish, reading and 
understanding obscure economic terminology was often a struggle. Trying to understand the 
political, economic and social context of countries that I have never visited was also difficult. 
Having lived in other Latin American countries helped me to better understand Argentina 
and Uruguay as they share some cultural and historical similarities, but also led me 
sometimes to make incorrect assumptions or over generalize from my previous experiences. 
 Finally a general challenge I experienced in doing global health research for the 
most part in the isolation of a grad students study lounge or my home office was remaining 
excited and passionate about the work I was doing. Despite the sometimes dry and 
disconnected work required by this research the process provided me with invaluable 
personal learning on issues close to my heart. Having a lived experience of the hardships 
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faced by people in Latin America this study allowed me the opportunity to reflect on and 
explore the broader political, economic and social issues that contributed to the suffering I 
encountered there.  In addition to my personal development, I hope also that this research is 
useful to global policy advocates and decision makers and contributes to the growing body 
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